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ABSTRACT
The ancients had Helene of Troy. We have Marilyn Monroe, followed by an army of her
imitators. Although humanity is made of its current myths and cultural clichés,
research has concluded that three-fourths of our language may infringe upon
intellectual property rights. However, the persona/celebrity is granted sole and
exclusive authorship in her making and consumption, especially through publicity
right, whose primary function is to prevent her unauthorized commercial exploitation,
and legally derives her justifications from copyright infrastructure, especially its ‘evil
twins:’ the false narratives of artistic neutrality and originality, as seen through its
most intrinsic doctrines: the idea/expression dichotomy versus the scènes à
faire/merger, and fair use. Inspired by the tort of "misappropriation," publicity right
morphed into the strongest intellectual property right, in constant combat with
copyright law and the First Amendment freedom of speech, thanks to judges' aesthetic
discrimination. In contrast, the parallel trademark law axis offers contradictory
solutions due to its doctrinal metamorphosis into an expressive genericity, as part of
our meta-langue, and the dilution doctrine. Hence, the ill balanced perception between
the persona/celebrity authorship and the public domain in copyright law, which is
amplified regarding publicity right, can be intrinsically cured through applying
trademark law's genericide to the idea/expression in copyright law. Thus, we can
retrieve our own lost authorship in our myths and clichés.

Cite as Mira Moldawer, Myths and Clichés: The Doctrinal Myopia of Publicity Right, 22
UIC REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 50 (2022).

MYTHS AND CLICHÉS: THE DOCTRINAL MYOPIA OF PUBLICITY RIGHT
MIRA MOLDAWER
I. INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................50
II. DISCUSSION ...................................................................................................................54
A. THE PERSONA/CELEBRITY MEANING: WHY BOTHER? ..........................54
B. PUBLICITY RIGHT ORIGINAL SIN: THE AXIS OF COPYRIGHT
LAW - THE WRONG IP RIGHT .............................................................................61
1. Copyright Law and its Monolithic Conception of Authorship ...................62
2. Copyright Miscellaneous Paradigms and Publicity Right .........................66
a. The Utilitarian/Incentive Approach and Publicity Right .................67
b. The Lockean/Labor Approach and Publicity Right ...........................72
c. The Personhood Approach and Publicity Right .................................73
3. Copyright Law "Evil Twins" and their Implications: The False
Narratives of Artistic Neutrality and Originality ......................................75
a. The Idea/Expression Dichotomy v. the "Scènes à Faire" and the
Merger Doctrines .................................................................................75
b. The Fair use doctrine ..........................................................................79
C. THE AXIS OF TRADEMARK LAW: PERSONA AUTHORSHIP
REVISED .............................................................................................................84
1. The Evolvement of Trademark Law: From a Triadic Model into a
Hypermark Defense ......................................................................................85
2. The Benefits of “he "Doctrinal Creep" .........................................................86
D. PERSONA GENERIC USE AS A PROPOSED SOLUTION ............................90
1. Is Fair Use Enough? .....................................................................................91
2. Persona Generic Use ....................................................................................92
III. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................94

[22:50 2022]

UIC Review of Intellectual Property

50

MYTHS AND CLICHÉS: THE DOCTRINAL MYOPIA OF PUBLICITY RIGHT
MIRA MOLDAWER*
I. INTRODUCTION
“Fame is a form of misunderstanding.” - Madonna1
The ancients had Helene of Troy as the quintessence of beauty and temptation.2
We have Marilyn Monroe.3 They dreamt of Herculean larger-than-life valor, strength,
and accomplishments. 4 We fantasize about James Bond, Rambo, or Superman.
Although humanity is made of its current myths and clichés, Beebe and Fromer’s
research concluded that "when we use our language, about three-fourths of the time
we are using a word that someone has claimed as a trademark."5 In a broader sense,
the aforementioned reference is to a culture of celebrities and brands that create "[t]he

* © Mira Moldawer, ORCID: 0000-0002-7989-6406. Attorney at Law; Director and senior Acting
Instructor, Beit Zvi, School of the Performing Arts, Israel; B.F.A in Theatre & Directing (Cum Laude);
Instructors Course Drama Centre, London, U.K; LL.B. Tel – Aviv University; MA Thesis Program in
Law, Technology and Business Innovation, Harry Radzyner Law School, Reichman University
(Summa Cum Laude); PhD candidate, Harry Radzyner School of Law, Reichman University; This
article is a part of my PhD thesis. I wish to thank Prof. Lior Zemer for his profound and inspiring
supervision, and Prof. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall and Prof. Dov Greenbaum for giving me the honor of
serving in my committee. I am also thankful to Harry Radzyner Law School, Reichman University's
senior staff and colleagues, for their suggestions, as well as to the UIC REV. INTELL. PROP. L. team for
their sharp editorial eye and constructive criticism.
1
Fame
is
a
Form
of
Misunderstanding,
QUOTE
FANCY,
https://quotefancy.com/quote/1133983/Madonna-Fame-is-a-form-of-misunderstanding (last visited
June 12, 2022).
2 Quora, What did Helen of Troy Look Like?, QUORA , https://www.quora.com/What-did-Helen-ofTroy-look-like (last visited June 12, 2022).
3 Michael Newton, Marilyn Monroe in Some Like it Hot … Still Smoking, THE GUARDIAN (July 18,
2014), https://www.theguardian.com/film/2014/jul/18/some-like-it-hot-marilyn-monroe-bfi-restored.
Michael Newtown crowns her as “unique yet generic – the quintessential blonde.” See also RICHARD
DYER, HEAVENLY BODIES: FILM STARS AND SOCIETY 20-53 (2d ed. 2004); see generally RICHARD DYER,
THE DUMB BLONDE STEREOTYPE (1979); GRAHAM MCCANN, MARILYN MONROE (1996).
4 See generally RICHARD BERTEMATTI, THE HERACLIAD: THE EPIC SAGA OF HERCULES (2014).
5 See Barton Beebe & Jeanne C. Fromer, Are We Running Out of Trademarks? An Empirical Study
of Trademark Depletion and Congestion, 131 HARV. L. REV. 945, 982 (2018); see also Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 N.D L. REV.
397, 397-98 (1990). Beebe and Fromer’s empirical research confirms the pioneering observation of
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss over thirty years ago.

[I]deograms that once functioned solely as signals denoting the source, origin, and
quality of goods, have become products in their own right, valued as indicators of
the status, preferences, and aspirations of those who use them. Some trademarks
have worked their way into the English language; others provide bases for vibrant,
evocative metaphors. In a sense, trademarks are the emerging lingua franca: with
a sufficient command of these terms, one can make oneself understood the world
over, and in the process, enjoy the comforts of home.
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Society of the Spectacle," as coined by Debord and morphed into our cultural texts.6
The images that replace the celebrities and create celebrity culture can be defined by
Turner as "the marriage of the culture of consumption with the democratic aspirations
to fulfill the American Dream," which is still one of the strongest myths created in
modern culture. 7 Because of this, the persona phenomenon became our "floating
signifier," heavily loaded with our dreams and desires, and a crucial part of the
contested terrain in which individuals make and establish their own cultural
meanings. 8 Consequently, cultural imagery by fandom creates a new concept of
authorship.9
While the celebrity is not the sole and exclusive author of the significance she has
for others, especially in an era where the users play a vital part in her creation, she is
getting more than her fair share in her legal authorship. This is best reflected by the
right of publicity, the primary function of which is to prevent the unauthorized
commercial exploitation of celebrity personae.10 The right of publicity grew out of the
tort of appropriation when it was acknowledged by the courts as a privacy tort.11 Thus,
the right of privacy is unsatisfactory for the protection of celebrities' commercial
interests.12 While right of publicity is intended to control the commercial use of one's
6

See GUY DEBORD, THE SOCIETY OF THE SPECTACLE (1967). The celebrity is
the spectacular representation of a living human being, embodies this banality by
embodying the image of a possible role. Being a star means specializing in the
seemingly lived; the star is the object of identification with the shallow seeming life
that has to compensate for the fragmented productive specializations which are
actually lived.

7 See GRAEME TURNER , UNDERSTANDING CELEBRITY 15 (2d ed. 2014); see Roberta Rosenthal
Kwall, Fame, 73 IND. L.J. 1, 21 (1997). Kwall advocates that the persona/celebrity phenomenon is the
manifestation of the American Dream. Id. The full title that Kwall uses is “The American Dream –
Anybody Can Be Anything/The ‘I Can Do It Too’ Mentality” to analyze how celebrities personify the
very core of the American Dream by democratizing fame. Id. at 22.
8 ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES: AUTHORSHIP,
APPROPRIATION, AND THE LAW 89 (1998) (hereinafter: The Cultural Life).

Celebrity names and images, however, are not simply marks of identity or simple
commodities; they are also cultural texts - floating signifiers that are continually
unvested with libidinal energies, social longings, and, I will argue, political
aspirations.
9 See JOHN TULLOCH & HENRY JENKINS, SCIENCE FICTION AUDIENCES: WATCHING DOCTOR WHO
AND STAR TREK (1st ed. 1995); ROSEMARY J. COOMBE , THE CELEBRITY IMAGE AND CULTURAL
IDENTITY: PUBLICITY RIGHTS AND THE SUBALTERN POLITICS OF GENDER 59 (1992); Sonia K. Katyal,
Performance, Property, and the Slashing of Gender in Fan Fiction, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER & SOC. POL’Y

& L. 461, 483, 498-9 (2006); Rebecca Tushnet, Legal Fictions: Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New
Common Law, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 651, 655-58 (1997). Scholars trace organized media fandom and
Fan fiction to the second season of Star Trek in 1967.
10 See Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights,
81 CAL. L. R. 125, 148-78 (1993) (focusing on the development of publicity right from fame to
commodification).
11 Id. at 167-72.
12 Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953). See also Tonia
Hap Murphy, The Right of Publicity: Worth a Closer Look in the Classroom, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. EDUC.
237, 240-41 (2019); see Madow, supra note 10, at 167.
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identity due to a defendant’s unauthorized appropriation, the right of privacy is meant
to protect hurt feelings.13 The right of publicity, as Gordon demonstrated, is considered
to be a "sisterly" doctrine to "dilution" in Trademark Law, due to its legal justification
as a tort of "misappropriation" that was created in International News Serv. v.
Associated Press ("INS''). 14 Hence, the question posed is: how have such "sisterly"
doctrines developed into two contradictory legal axes with different vocabularies
regarding celebrity authorship?
The very infrastructure of the celebrity right of publicity is based on copyright
law’s authorship paradigms.15 Initially, copyright law dealt with fictional characters
and not real people. However, the monolithic axis of copyright law authorship evolved
from the Enlightenment Era, and its categorical imperative perception fits the
anachronistic and romantic idea of the author as an agonized genius solely in charge
of creativity.16 Thus, if one creator is the sole proprietor of originality, then there is no
inspiration for others–only plagiarism. 17 Copyright law’s "evil twins," the false
narratives of artistic neutrality and originality, are seen through its most important,
intrinsic tools: the idea/expression dichotomy versus the "scènes à faire," merger
doctrines, and the fair use doctrine. This has culminated in a threat to the freedoms of
speech and information due to general "look and feel" adjudication.18 As a result of
judges’ “aesthetic discrimination" and instinct, what should constitute an idea morphs
into an expression, thus, rubbing the public domain's ever diminishing quarry. 19
Likewise, transformative use, as the quintessence of fair use, proves that the marriage
of aesthetic nondiscrimination and originality begot the closure of the cultural public
common, either through the parody/satire dichotomy, or through the courts'
interpretation of the commercial use component, rendering the distinction between
13 See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, A Perspective on Human Dignity, the First Amendment, and the
Right of Publicity, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1345, 1356 (2009).
14 See Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary
Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 152-3 (1992). Gordon notes that "as property, it owes much to
misappropriation doctrine" (in contrast to its origin as an outgrowth of the right of privacy). Id. at
152.; Int’l News Serv. v. A.P., 248 U.S. 215, 239 (1918).
15 Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977); see generally Mark A.
Lemley, Privacy, Property, and Publicity, 117 MICH. L. REV. 1153, 1170, n. 76 (2019). Mark Lemley
appropriates this continuous error to the only publicity right case that reached the Supreme Court, in
which the whole plaintiff's show was copied by the defendant, rendering the case to look "more like a
common-law copyright claim than a traditional right of publicity claim." See also Kwall, supra note 7,
at 35. For the incentive approach, see id. at 35-38. For the personhood approach, see id. at 38-40. See
also David Tan, Beyond Trademark Law: What the Right of Publicity Can Learn from Cultural
Studies, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENM’T 913, 928, 931, 936 (2008). For the incentive approach, see id. at
936; for the Lockean/labor approach, see id. at 930-31. Tan justifies publicity right legal infrastructure
by using four different classifications: the Lockean/Labor Approach, the restitution paradigm of unjust
enrichment, the Incentive Approach for enhancing creativity, and the economic Utilitarian Approach.
16 See generally MARTHA WOODMANSEE & PETER JASZI, THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP:
TEXTUAL APPROPRIATION OF LAW AND LITERATURE (POST-CONTEMPORARY INTERVENTIONS) (1994)
(hereinafter: The Construction of Authorship) (discussing the “Authorship project”).
17 See Martha Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright : Economic and Legal Conditions of
the Emergence of the 'Author,' 17 Eighteenth-Century Studies 425, 426-7, 445-6 (1984). Woodmansee
writes of the construction of the "Author." Id.; see also Woodmansee & Jaszi, supra note 16.
18 See Robert Kirk Walker, Breaking with Convention: The Conceptual Failings of Scènes À Faire
38 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 435, 448, 463 (2020); See also Rebecca Tushnet, Judges as Bad
Reviewers: Fair Use and Epistemological Humility, 25 LAW & LIT. 20, 25-6 (2013).
19 Walker, supra note 18.
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news, entertainment, and commerce almost impossible.20 The right of publicity is a
relatively new intellectual property (“IP”) right, created by state courts, and without
federal precedent. 21 Although utilizing copyright law creates problematic
infrastructure, the right of publicity is not subject to its constraints, thus, proving to
be the strongest IP right. 22 In contrast to copyright law's maladies, the right of
publicity requires no misrepresentation, its scope can encompass all of a persona’s
personality characteristics, and its posthumous protection is longer than copyright.23
However, a parallel trademark law axis offers contradictory solutions due to its
doctrinal metamorphosis. While this trademark law axis is a far cry from its original
legal infrastructure, it can better solve the celebrity phenomenon that obstructs our
culture. First, as Dreyfuss and Beebe observed, the original triad of trademark law is
practically obsolete as trademarks morphed to be commodities that worked their way
into our meta – langue. 24 This evolvement caused the trademarks to evolve into
“expressive genericity,” as distinctive from its competitive and commercial aims. 25
Second, the dilution doctrine transformed to protect goodwill as an expression, not as
an idea. 26 Thus, trademark law is better at relieving freedom of speech from the
parody/satire dichotomy and the commercial speech discrimination by Copyright Law’s
"evil twins."
This article poses the question: can we transform the trademark law genericide
paradigm that unarms the previously protected persona/celebrity by signing into the
category of an idea, thus unarming the persona/celebrity right of publicity from its
20 See Bruce P. Keller & Rebecca Tushnet, Even More Parodic than the Real Thing: Parody
Lawsuits Revisited, 94 TRADEMARK REP. 979, 980, 983 (2004); Matthew Savare, Image is Everything,
INTELL. PROP. MAG. 52 (Mar. 2013). The issue of the "hybrid speech" is the most complicated and
disputed in copyright claims. Id. at 53. (This issue is especially true in regarding the hybrid media.).
21 Id.; see Madow, supra note 10, at 147-78 (focusing on the history of publicity right).
22 White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1516 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, A.
dissenting).

No fair use exception; no right to parody; no idea-expression dichotomy. It
impoverishes the public domain, to the detriment of future creators and the public
at large. Instead of well-defined, limited characteristics such as name, likeness or
voice, advertisers will now have to cope with vague claims of 'appropriation of
identity,’ claims often made by people with a wholly exaggerated sense of their own
fame and significance.
23 See Mira Moldawer, “What is an Author” of a Persona? The Taming of the Shrew—Rephrasing
Publicity Right, 20 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 156, 162, 173-4 (2021). Moldawer discusses the history of
publicity right and its crystallization in the United States. Id. at 173-76; see also Jonathan Faber,
Right
of
Publicity,
Statutes
&
Interactive
Map,
RIGHT
OF
PUBLICITY,
https://rightofpublicity.com/statutes (last visited June 14, 2022); Jennifer E. Rothman, Right of
Publicity State-by-State, RIGHT OF PUBLICITY, https://www.rightofpublicityroadmap.com (last visited
June 14, 2022) (current state of publicity right).
24 See Dreyfuss supra note 5, at 397-8; Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law,
51 UCLA L. REV. 621, 669, 677, 679 (2004).
25 See id. at 645-46. For the original triad of trademark law, i.e.: identifying goods' source and
distinguishing them from others; see also Plasticolor Molded Prods., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 713 F.
Supp. 1329, 1332 (C.D. Cal.1989). ([Trademarks have] begun to leap out of their role as sourceidentifiers and, in certain instances have effectively become goods in their own right.).
26 Barton Beebe, Intellectual Property Law and the Sumptuary Code, 123 HARV. L. REV. 810, 845
(2010).
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overpowering doctrinal armor? Namely, can we treat the persona as our social code,
either under the scènes à faire doctrine or the merger doctrine? Section A discusses
the evolvement of the modern persona's role in the cultural mechanism, as well as her
playing an integral part of our language, identity, and consumption. Section B
examines the right of publicity’s "original sin" in its embedment in the axis of copyright
law as the wrong IP right, and its implications. Section C proposes a better balance
between the persona and the public domain through the axis of trademark law
authorship. That is to say: how both the two prongs of trademark law fundamental
evolvement blurred the distinction between trademark law and copyright law; the first
prong refers to the evolvement of trademark law from its triad model that was meant
to avoid consumers' confusion into the “hypermark” model perception; the second prong
refers to Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 (TDRA). 27 Section D suggests a
different model of persona authorship by applying trademark law's genericide to the
right of publicity through a different reading of the idea/expression dichotomy in the
copyright law toolkit, thus, attempting to cure the maladies of copyright law
authorship intrinsically.
II. DISCUSSION
A. THE PERSONA/CELEBRITY MEANING: WHY BOTHER?
Humanity is made of its current Myth as "a basic constituent of human culture.” 28
As Geertz deciphers, culture is
[b]elieving . . . that man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he
himself has spun. I take culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be
therefore not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretative
one in search of meaning. It is explication I am after, construing social
expression on their surface enigmatical.29
Therefore, Shakespeare's famous quote "[w]e are such stuff/[a]s dreams are made
on . . . "30 can be transformed into the conclusion of Beebe and Fromer's research that
about three quarters of the language and images in our use might be liable for
trademark infringement. 31 As society has shifted from print typography into the
medium of the image, each medium conveys knowledge appropriate to its essence.32 As
Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006. Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 (2006).
See Richard G.A. Buxton, Myth, BRITANNICA https://www.britannica.com/topic/myth (last
visited March 11, 2022); see also AHARON SHABTAI, GREEK MYTHOLOGY 251-7 (2000) [Ha-Mitologya
Ha-Yevanit].
29 CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES: SELECTED ESSAYS 5 (1973).
30 William Shakespeare, The Tempest, act 4, sc. 1, l. 145.
31 Beebe & Fromer, supra note 5, at 982.
32 See NEIL POSTMAN, AMUSING OURSELVES TO DEATH: PUBLIC DISCOURSE IN THE AGE OF SHOW
BUSINESS 8-10, 12-13, 15 (1985). Postman took McLuhan's aphorism ‘the medium is the message’
further, claiming that “the medium is the metaphor.” Id. Postman claims that the visual media turned
the viewers into a mere passive role. Id. See also STUART HALL, ET AL., CULTURE, MEDIA, LANGUAGE:
27
28
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the form dictates new content, the image defeats the word, and passion overcomes
rational argument. Therefore, the image, best enhanced by the persona, is our text. In
addition to the persona's integral part of our cultural baggage, especially in an era that
is characterized as "The Culture of Narcissism," she serves as a crucial ambassador of
the "Libidinal Economy," in which compulsive consumption manipulates us to
purchase the illusionary images in our eternal quest for artificial satisfaction of our
desires.33
The media and technological changes that created the culture of the image, such as
the outset of print and its subsequent democratization of fame, enhanced by the art
of photography and cinematography are responsible for the persona being a key
figure in understanding popular culture.34 These two aspects also impact the great
representation crisis of postmodernism that culminated in morphing the persona into
a "floating signifier," heavily impacted y our myths, dreams, and desires.35
The great catastrophes of Fascism and Totalitarianism caused the "postmodern
condition" as coined by Lyotard.36 No more could humanity console herself with the
messianic dogma in scientific progress and rationalism, hand in hand with political
freedom, human solidarity, or aesthetic redemption through art. Those
"metanarratives" or "grand narratives," were abolished due to the fall of the great
illusions that begot them. Once the great enlightenment axiom of an eternal absolute
truth was challenged, the semiotic code of an illusionary heterogeneous culture was
broken.
As Beebe points out, semiotics has followed two independent lines: the ‘linguistic’
tradition of Ferdinand de Saussure, and the ‘logical’ tradition of Charles Sanders

WORKING PAPERS IN CULTURAL STUDIES 117 (1980). Hall challenges Postman’s claim and challenged
it utilizing the Encoding/Decoding theory of communication. See also STUART HALL, THE SPECTACLE
OF THE ‘OTHER,’ REPRESENTATION: CULTURAL REPRESENTATIONS AND SIGNIFYING PRACTICES 270
(1997). Here, Hall completed and reversed The Frankfurt School theorists who generally viewed massmediated popular culture as a field in which autocratic and dominant meanings are systematically
reproduced and reinforced by the culture industries. The audience, according to Hall, is not a passive
and a mere silent majority, but an active component in culture transformation. See Max Horkheimer
and Theodor W. Adorno, The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception, in MAX
HORKHEIMER AND THEODOR W. ADORNO, DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT, PHILOSOPHICAL
FRAGMENTS 94 (1947).
33 See CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE CULTURE OF NARCISSISM: AMERICAN LIFE IN AN AGE OF
DIMINISHING EXPECTATIONS 38 (1979); see Iain Hamilton Grant, Introduction to JEAN FRANCOIS
LYOTARD, LIBIDINAL ECONOMY, at xii-xiv (1974). See also GILLES DELEUZE AND FELIX GUATTARI.
ANTI-OEDIPUS: CAPITALISM AND SCHIZOPHRENIA 1-9, 26-31, 373 (1972). Lyotard was greatly
influenced by Deleuze and Guattari. Id. Deleuze and Guattari regarded society as a mechanism of
desiring-machines manufactured by Consumer Capitalism. Id.
34 Madow, supra note 10, at 149-168; Kwall, supra note 7, at 5-7.
35 See Turner, supra note 7, at 6; 8; 10. Originally, persona meant “a mask,” referring to one
commonly used in the theatre of ancient Greece. Id. In its current meaning, persona is the personality
that the celebrity shows the world, while functioning socially as a public “commodity.” Id. Focusing
on the tension between the persona as a personality and her diverse aspects as a public commodity.
See Moldawer, supra note 23, at 159-61 (the development of the modern persona/celebrity
phenomenon).
36 See Fredric Jameson, Foreword to JEAN FRANCOIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A
REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE, at XI, XVIII, XXIV-V (1979).
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Peirce.37 Although they offer different semiotic models, they both understood culture
and language to be concerned with everything that can be taken as a sign.38
Saussure's dyadic model of a sign consists of 'the signifier' (a linguistic form, e.g.,
a word; a 'sound-image') and 'the signified' (the meaning of the form).39 Unlike Peirce's
triadic model, the 'the signifier' does not correspond to the named physical object (the
referent in Peirce's model), but to its psychological concept. 40 Hence, the linguistic sign
gains its meaning from the psychological association between the signifier and the
signified. "The linguistic sign unites, not a thing and a name, but a concept and a
sound- image."41 The sign "follows no law other than that of tradition, and because it
is based on tradition, it is arbitrary."42 Saussure’s binary oppositions theory introduced
the important dichotomy of langue, the abstract and invisible layer of a language, as
opposed to the parole, namely, the actual speech that we use in real life. 43
Consequently, "[l]angue is structure; parole is event." 44 Peirce's triadic sign model
consists of three elements which correspond with Saussure dyadic model. 45 As
summarized by Beebe:
Peirce's sign consists, then, of three elements, each of which corresponds to
one of Peirce's three categories of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness. The
first element, comparable to Saussure's signifier, is the representamen, the
perceptible object, the ‘vehicle conveying into the mind something from
without.’ The second element is the object, or ‘referent’ as this Article will call
it, which can be a physical ‘object of the world’ or a mental entity ‘of the
nature of thought or of a sign.’ The third element, comparable to the
Saussurean signified, is the interpretant, which Peirce defined as ‘[creating]

Beebe, supra note 24.
See FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE, COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS 16 (1916). “A science that
studies the life of signs within society is conceivable; it would be a part of social psychology and
consequently of general psychology; I shall call it semiology." Id. See also CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE,
COLLECTED PAPERS OF CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE 252 (1934).
39 See Beebe, supra note 24, at 633-35.
40 Id. at 636-37; Charles Sanders Peirce, The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, THE
COLLECTED
PAPERS
OF
CHARLES
SANDERS
PEIRCE
(1994),
https://colorysemiotica.files.wordpress.com/2014/08/peirce-collectedpapers.pdf.
37
38

A sign, or representamen, is something which stands to somebody for something in
some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of that
person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign. That sign which it
creates I call the interpretant of the first sign. The sign stands for something, its
object. It stands for that object, not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea.
De Saussure, supra note 38, at 66.
Id. at 74.
43 Beebe, supra note 24, at 638-42.
44 Id. at 638
45 See CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, ON THOUGHTS IN SIGNS, COLLECTED PAPERS OF CHARLES
SANDERS PEIRCE 339 (1934).
41
42
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something in the Mind of the Interpreter,’ ‘the "proper significate effect,’ ‘the
proper effect of the sign.’46
An integral part of postmodernist resistance to one universal truth or center was
its "rejection of the strict anchoring of particular signifiers to particular signifiers."47
This evolved into the "floating signifier," concept originated by Claude Lévi-Strauss,
namely, a signifier without a specific signified, known also as an ‘empty signifier.’48
Hence, the free-floating signifiers are "emancipated from the tyranny of the referent,
both the sign and the signified” in rebellion "from the ideal, rational and to coherent
ego, existing at the expense of the other which it suppresses."49 This emancipation of
the sign is what characterizes our society as simulacra, where the real is dead, as
noted by Baudrillard:
The emancipation of the sign: remove this archaic obligation to designate
something and it finally becomes free, indifferent, and totally indeterminate,
in the structural or combinatory play which succeeds the previous rule of
determinate equivalence.... The floatation of money and signs, the floatation
of needs and ends of production, the floatation of labor itself..., the real has
died of the shock of value acquiring this fantastic autonomy. 50
Baudrillard's prediction places the persona in a new role: a signifier that indicates
nothing but herself, as "the signified and the referent are now abolished." 51 The
46 Beebe, supra note 24, at 636. To complete the picture, this process goes for ever. The sign is
"[a]nything which determines something else (its interpretant) to refer to an object to which itself
refers . . . in the same way, the interpretant becoming in turn a sign, and so on ad infinitum." Id. at
638. See also CHARLES S. HARDWICK AND JAMES COOK, SEMIOTIC & SIGNIFICS: THE CORRESPONDENCE
BETWEEN CHARLES S. PEIRCE & VICTORIA LADY WELBY 80-81 (1977). As Peirce explained his theory
in a letter to Lady Welby,

I define a Sign as anything which is so determined by something else, called its
Object, and so determines an effect upon a person, which effect I call its
Interpretant, that the latter is thereby mediately determined by the former. My
insertion of ‘upon a person’ is a sop to Cerberus, because I despair of making my
own broader conception understood.
Id. at 80-81.
47 See Jeffrey Mehlman, The ‘Floating Signifier’: From Lévi-Strauss to Lacan, 48 YALE FRENCH
STUD., FRENCH FREUD: STRUCTURAL STUD. IN PSYCHOANALYSIS 10, 23 (1972).
48 Id. ("This dissymmetry between the synchronic (structural) nature of the meant and the diachronic
nature of the known results in the existence of "an overabundance of signifier (significant) in relation
to the signifies to which it might apply." And it is this "floating signifier," this "semantic function
whose role is to allow symbolic thought to operate despite the contradiction inherent in it" which LeviStrauss sees, in this elusive essay, as the reality of mana. It is "a symbol in the pure state," thus apt
to be charged with any symbolic content: "symbolic value zero.")
49
Jeanne Willette, Postmodernism and The Trail of the Floating Signifier,
ARTHISTORYUNSTUFFED (Feb. 21, 2014). https://arthistoryunstuffed.com/postmodernism-floatingsignifier/.
50 See JEAN BAUDRILLARD, SYMBOLIC EXCHANGE AND DEATH 6-7 (1993).
51 See JEAN BAUDRILLARD, THE MIRROR OF PRODUCTION 127-8 (1975).
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persona is both the means and the end establishing the dominant, obsessive
consumption culture based on false substitutes, replacing reality altogether.
Implementing Baudrillard's vocabulary, the persona is the embodiment of an image
which is utterly severed from its source, thus transforming into a simulacrum that
leaves only “the desert of the real.” 52 Therefore, "the Beckham sign, for example,
‘develops into a metalanguage and becomes a significant resource for cultural
expression and critique," and morphs into "a floating signifier. 53 Beckham is
significant without being much interested in the specific signals he sends out."54
The celebrity as a floating signifier is a far cry from Hollywood's Golden Age that
cultivated a “cult of personality” for its stars through the "close up," the gossip columns,
and the "fans' letters,” to make up for the ever-shrinking "Aura" of the authentic art
that was lost through duplication.55 Thus, the cult of the movie star, fostered by film
industry funds, preserved not only the person’s unique aura, but the “picture
personality,” the phony enchantment of a commodity. 56 However, even then,
The form-sign describes an entirely different organization: the signified and the
referent are now abolished to the sole profit of the play of signifiers, of a generalized
formalization in which the code no longer refers back to any subjective or objective
"reality," but to its own logic. . . . The sign no longer designates anything at all. It
approaches its true structural limit which is to refer back only to other signs. All
reality then becomes the place of a semiurgical manipulation, of a structured
simulation.
52 See JEAN BAUDRILLARD, SIMULACRA AND SIMULATION 1 (Sheila Faria Glaser trans.,1994)
[1981]. Simulacra is a reference with no referent, a hyper-reality; see SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK, WELCOME TO THE
DESERT OF THE REAL 12 (2002). The title is borrowed from the 1999 Matrix, which was directed by
Lana Wachowski and Lilly Wachowski.
53 See David Tan, The Lost Language of the First Amendment in Copyright Fair Use: A Semiotic
Perspective of the ‘Transformative Use’ Doctrine Twenty-Five Years On, 26 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 311, 385 (2016); see also David Tan, The Unbearable Whiteness of Beckham:
Political Recoding of Celebrity Signs in First Amendment Jurisprudence, in TRANSPARENCY, POWER,
& CONTROL: PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL COMMUNICATION 217 (2012).
54
See Peter Conrad, Blend it like Beckham, THE GUARDIAN (May 23, 2003)
https://www.theguardian.com/theobserver/2003/may/25/features.review7:

He is a reflection of our media age; the man himself – a simple soul, with a talent
that begins below his ankles - is a medium, and he exists to transmit whatever
message you wish (or are prepared to pay for). Don't be racist, drink Pepsi, it's all
much the same. Structural linguists would call him a floating signifier. He's
significant without being much interested in the specific signals he sends out.
55
See Walter Benjamin, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, in
ILLUMINATIONS 217 (Harry Zohn, trans., Hannah Arendt, ed. 1969). Benjamin
discusses the
resurrection of a new “aura” that was lost in the process of duplicating, ending with the copy being as
good as its original. See also Neal Gabler, Toward a New Definition of Celebrity, USC ANNENBERG
THE NORMAN LEAR CENTERTAINMENT (2015) https://learcenter.org/images/event_uploads/Gabler.pdf
at 1-4; Turner, supra note 7, at 11-2 (discussing the transference of the stars' lost aura into mass
production and commodification); see NEAL GABLER, WINCHELL: GOSSIP, POWER, AND THE CULTURE
OF CELEBRITY 666 (2006).
56 Turner, supra note 7, at 13:

Incorporating the residue of the press agentry networks developed around live
theatre and vaudeville, and seeking a means of industrialising the marketing of
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diminishing the persona role to a mere commodity, passively consumed by its audience,
would be an oversimplification. The question posed by Dyer: “are stars a phenomenon
of production (arising from what the makers of films provide) or of consumption
(arising from what the audience for films demands)?” is more complicated than it
sounds.57 As partially answered by Alberoni: “[t]he star system . . . never creates the
star, but it proposes the candidate for "election"’ and helps to retain the favor of the
"electors.” 58
As described by Weiss, Dietrich and Garbo images were "encoded and decoded" by
the lesbian metropolitan communities in America during the 30s, as part of their need
to build a new identity that disrupts conventional definitions of female heterosexuality.
This recreated and reauthorized the images in an ironic contrast to their mainstream
image as sex symbols and mega-femme fatale. 59 Likewise, Judy Garland’s ever
evolving image from the girl next door into a desperate has been turned into a semiotic
sign created by the gay community in their identification with her perils.60 Therefore,
the celebrity image is much more than a cultural narrative, synonymous with the
dominant culture. On the contrary, she is a crucial part of what Stuart Hall believed
to be the contested terrain in which individuals make and establish their own cultural
meanings.61 In the process, individuals resist and even subvert the preferred meanings
(codes) that are generated and circulated by the culture industries through reappropriating them for new meanings ("decoding"). 62 Elaborating upon the
Birmingham School's "Encoding and Decoding" doctrines, scholars like John Fiske
their new product – the narrative feature film – the nascent American film industry
experiences a number of significant shifts that result in the marketing of the ‘picture
personality’ and, later on, ‘the star’.
See RICHARD DYER, STARS 9 (1998).
See Francesco Alberoni, The Powerless ‘Elite’: Theory and Sociological Research on the
Phenomenon of the Stars 93 (1972) in DENIS MCQUAIL, SOCIOLOGY OF MASS COMMUNICATIONS:
SELECTED READINGS (1972).
59 See ANDREA WEISS, VAMPIRES AND VIOLETS: LESBIANS IN THE CINEMA 32-39 (1992); Paul
McDonald, Reconceptualising Stardom, STARS 192 (1998):
57
58

Andrea Weiss describes how Dietrich and Garbo became significant stars for
lesbians in America during the 30s, a period when a middle-class white lesbian
subculture was first emerging in metropolitan centres (Vampires and Violets, pp.
35-6). Weiss argues that the significance of Dietrich and Garbo for lesbians came
from subcultural gossip about the sexual lives of the two stars, together with
readings of how the performances of both stars consistently made ironic references
to the institution of marriage and played with dress codes to disrupt conventional
definitions of female heterosexuality (pp. 32-9). Both stars became important for the
emerging subculture because they were not only desirable but also functioned as
public representations of a 'truth' which was only fully comprehended by
subcultural knowledge.
60 Dyer, supra note 3, at 137-91. See also Kwall, supra note 7, at 3; Rosemary J. Coombe,
Author/Izing the Celebrity: Publicity Rights, Postmodern Politics, and Unauthorized Genders, 10
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 365, 380 (1992); Madow, supra note 10, at 194-5 (scholars in opposing
views regarding celebrity authorship over her image, using the Garland phenomenon, and a detailed
analysis of coding/recoding Garland image).
61 Hall, supra note 32 (1997), at 223, 270.
62 Hall, supra note 32 (1980), at 117, 127.
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have extended popular resistance beyond that of oppositional groups like
subcultures.63 Fiske coined the term “semiotic democracy” to describes the interaction
between the persona and its unpredictable audiences that engage in using cultural
symbols or narratives to express meanings that are different from the ones intended
by their creators. 64 The re-working of cultural imagery by fandom created a new
concept of authorship.65 Fans develop a "‘shadow cultural economy’ that lies outside
that of the cultural industries yet share features with them which more normal
popular culture lacks."66 Hence, fandom's products of the cultural industries "must be
understood, therefore, in terms of productivity, not of reception."67 Consequently, the
dichotomy of the author/persona versus the public becomes blurry. As three
components created the persona–its magnetism, the media, and the public–the
persona is not its sole author.68
Hence, the persona developed to be part of our language and identity, functioning
as a "signifier" of new narratives, especially by minorities who need to recreated her
in order to represent them in the "Major" dominant literature, as coined by Deleuze
and Guattari.69 The Major is "the real voice of a marginalized, minority people reappropriating the major language for their own purposes and stressing collective forces
over the individual ‘literary master.’"70 In an era in which the users play a vital part
in the persona's creation, they were supposed to get their fair share in her creation.
Evoking Perry Barlow's famous declaration, information is meant to be free, and with
63

JOHN FISKE, UNDERSTANDING POPULAR CULTURE 126-27 (1989):
Popular pleasures must be those of the oppressed, they must contain elements of
the oppositional, the evasive, the scandalous, the offensive, the vulgar, the resistant.
The pleasures offered by ideological conformity are muted and are hegemonic; they
are not popular pleasures and work in opposition to them.

64 See JOHN FISKE, TELEVISION CULTURE 236 (1987) (“[d]elegation of the production of meanings
and pleasures to [television's] viewers.”).
65 See generally ABRAHAM DRASSINOWER, TAKING USER RIGHTS SERIOUSLY IN THE PUBLIC
INTEREST: THE FUTURE OF CANADIAN COPYRIGHT LAW (2005) (considering users as authors in their
own merit, as Authorship is itself a mode of use).
66 See John Fiske, The Cultural Economy of Fandom, THE ADORING AUDIENCE: FAN CULTURE
AND POPULAR MEDIA (1992) 30, https://paas.org.pl/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Fiske.pdf; see also
PIERRE BOURDIEU, DISTINCTION: A SOCIAL CRITIQUE OF THE JUDGEMENT OF TASTE (1984). Fiske
takes Bourdieu’s model further. Fiske agrees with the model that cultural capital is acquired by the
educational system and consists of the knowledge and critical appreciation of a particular cultural
‘canon,’ but argues that it should not be narrowed only to Bourdieu's "two-dimensional map in which
the vertical, or north–south, axis records the amount of capital (economic and cultural) possessed, and
the horizontal, or east–west, records the type of capital (economic or cultural)." Id. Thus, the model
should be enlarged to include gender, age, and race as additional axes. Id. at 31.
67 Id. at 37. “This melding of the team or performer and the fan into a productive community
minimizes differences between artist and audience and turns the text into an event, not an art object.”
Id. at 40.
68 See Lior Zemer, The Social Bargain in Copyright, in MISHPATIM 297, 302-03 (2017) [Hebrew].
See also DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE IMAGE: A GUIDE TO PSEUDO-EVENTS IN AMERICA 57 (1961). "A
celebrity is a person who is known for his well-knownness. He is the ‘human pseudo-event’ who has
been manufactured for us but who has no substantiality, something hollow that is a manifestation of
our own hollowness." Id.
69 See generally GILLES DELEUZE AND FELIX GUATTARI, KAFKA: TOWARD A MINOR LITERATURE
(1975).
70 See ADRIAN PARR, THE DELEUZE DICTIONARY 36 (2005).
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the internet having become its core, information should regain its initial freedom.71
Accordingly, the commercial arena will transform itself from commodities marketing
to information marketing, thus establishing a new economy: the economy of
information.72 However, Perry Barlow did not foresee the irony of dialectics–those who
rejoiced in the internet as decreasing the government's control are lamenting its
metamorphosis into a vehicle of cultural control.73 Therefore, the question of persona
authorship, inevitably, leads to the real issue behind its publicity right: who is the legal
author of our myths and our dreams?74 As Clifford Geertz argued, our values, feelings,
and ideas are cultural products.75 Hence, "what is an author of a persona” hides the
real dilemma: who is granted with authorship of our culture? This question is
contradictorily answered under copyright law and trademark law as hereafter
explained.
B. PUBLICITY RIGHT ORIGINAL SIN: THE AXIS OF COPYRIGHT LAW - THE
WRONG IP RIGHT
Prominent scholars have claimed for decades that the doctrinal justification for
publicity right is embedded in trademark law better than in copyright law, which
grants the persona sole authorship in her image. 76 Lemley appropriates this
continuous error to the only publicity right case that has reached the Supreme Court:
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.77 In Zacchini, the plaintiff’s show was
copied by the defendant, rendering the case to look "more like a common-law copyright
claim than a traditional right of publicity claim."78 In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice
Byron R. White, the Court held that The First and Fourteenth Amendments do not
immunize the news media when they broadcast a performer's entire act without his
consent.79

71 See Niva Elkin-Koren, Private Ordering and Copyrights in the Information Age, 2 ALEI
MISPHAT 319, 319, 344-5 (2002) [Hebrew].
72 See John P. Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND.,
www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence (last visited Jan. 27, 2022); John Perry Barlow, Selling Wine
Without Bottles: The Economy of Mind on the Global Net, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 8, 10, 12, 30-31
(2019).
73 James Boyle, Is the Internet Over?! (Again?), 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV . 32, 40, 59-60 (2019);
Yochai Benkler, A Political Economy of Utopia, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 78, 81-2 (2019); Jessica
Litman, Imaginary Bottles, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 127, 128-9, 131-2, 135-6 (2019); Pamela
Samuelson & Kathryn Hashimoto, The Enigma of Digital Property: A Tribute to John Perry Barlow,
18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 103, 109-11 (2019). All these articles were written as a tribute to John Perry
Barlow’s legacy.
74 Coombe, supra note 60, at 395; Rosemary J. Coombe & Andrew Herman, Culture Wars on the
Net: Intellectual, Property and Corporate Propriety in Digital Environments, 100 THE S. ATL. Q. 919,
920-22 (2001).
75 Geertz, supra note 29.
76 Keller & Tushnet, supra note 20, at 1015; Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the Right
of Publicity Can Learn from Trademark Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1164-65 (2006).
77 Lemley, supra note 15; Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977).
78 Lemley, supra note 15, at 1170, n. 76.
79 Zacchini, 433 U. S. at 566-68.
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Originally, as Bracha demonstrates, American trademark law inherited common
law's duality that "loosely unified the tort and property branches." 80 Initially,
trademark law was meant to defend the trademark owner, due to commercial life as
handled by local and small markets, even after the markets evolved to include vast
areas that bred competition and publicity. 81 This created the need to differentiate
trademarks as a source and meaning signifier. 82 This duality prevailed, as "the
protected interest was that of the mark owner in preventing illegitimate diversion of
his trade, but it was the deceit of consumers that made the diversion illegitimate." 83
Although, as noted by Shur-Ofri, it does not matter for the public what IP right
was infringed upon by the persona’s allegedly unauthorized appropriation, each legal
discipline leads to a contradictory outcome. 84 There is a better chance for the public
domain to gain the upper hand if trademark infringement is claimed, while the same
scenario would be reversed under copyright law's umbrella. 85 As Gordon
demonstrated, the tort of "misappropriation" that was created in Int’l News Serv. v.
Associated Press (“INS”), inspired sister doctrines such as the "right of publicity" and
"dilution" in trademark law, which are all embedded in the restitution paradigm. 86
Hence, the question posed is: why do "sisterly" doctrines develop into two contradictory
legal axes, that talk with different vocabularies in regard to persona authorship?
1. Copyright Law and its Monolithic Conception of Authorship
The very infrastructure of the persona/celebrity publicity right is based on
copyright law authorship's paradigms.87 "If value/then right" is the core dilemma of IP
since its inception, especially in Copyright Law. 88 As discoursed in this section
Authorship as equivalent to value was a revolutionary concept begotten in the
80 Oren Bracha, The Emergence and Development of United States Intellectual Property Law, THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTELL. PROP. L. 258 (2018).
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 See MICHAL SHUR -OFRY, POPULARITY AND NETWORKS IN COPYRIGHT LAW 250 (2011) [Hebrew].
These IP rights include trademark law, copyright law or publicity right.
85 Lemley, supra note 15, at 1173-6.
86 Gordon, supra note 14; Int’l News, 248 U.S. at 215; Id. at 165. "[T]hese constraints, which
together constitute a slimmed-down misappropriation tort that I call ‘malcompetitive copying,’ apply
both corrective justice and economic insights drawn from the restitution pattern.”
87 See LIOR ZEMER, THE IDEA OF AUTHORSHIP IN COPYRIGHT 12-13, 16 (2007) (for authorship
justifications in copyright law). See also Madow, supra note 10, at 181-196, 206-25 (the same
justifications are advanced in publicity right and are discussed in legal literature in connection with
publicity right versus copyright law and the First Amendment, although the appliance of judicial
doctrines that were meant for fiction to real people is never clarified.).
88 See Rebecca Tushnet, Intellectual Property as a Public Interest Mechanism, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 102 (2017):

Incentive theory, indeed, is a notable contributor to the metastasis of the right of
publicity in American law, despite the empirical dubiousness of the claims that
celebrities need economic incentives in the form of control over all commercial uses
of their identities. In IP, “if value, then right,” is unfortunately not only a realist
criticism, but also a never-ending threat.
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Enlightenment era and the legal right Authorship merits is a contestable issue ever
since.89 Hence the inherent IP rights dilemma, "if value/then right/then property right"
is even more complicated regarding publicity right of the living. This right is embedded
in copyright law, as an IP discipline meant for the fictional. Ironically, our reality sees
no difference between the real and the fictional. The real and the fictional are both a
work of fantasy, and in search of an author. This explains why the question posed
regarding publicity right authorship of the real is answered by copyright law
paradigms, which deal with authorship of the fictional, reflecting Jorge Luis Borges'
quote: “[l]ife itself is a quotation.”90
The insistence of copyright law on exclusive authorship goes hand in hand with
its doctrinal infrastructure designed during the Enlightenment Era, especially its
radical reformation of the "Author." 91 Previously, this market was regulated by a
system of printing privileges, subsequently replaced by copyright laws during the 18th
and 19th centuries, meant to defend the interests of publishers and booksellers,
whereas authors were considered mere craftsmen.92 Between the privilege and the
intellectual property paradigms, the right-based (instead of value-based) approach
emerged, which anchored its foundations in classical philosophy, as expressed by
Immanuel Kant.93
Book is a writing, which represents a discourse addressed by someone
to the public, through visible signs of speech. […] He who speaks to the
public in his own name is called the author (auctor); he who addresses
the writing to the public in the name of the author is the publisher. […]
The publisher, again, speaks, by the aid of the printer as his workman
(operarius), yet not in his own name, for otherwise he would be himself
the author, but in the name of the author; and he is only entitled to do
so in virtue of a mandate (mandatum) given him to that effect by the
author.
There is a primary relationship between the author and the public through the
author’s public speech. This relationship underlies and regulates all other speeches
that give rise to a series of secondary relationships between the author, the publisher,

89 See Woodmansee & Jaszi, supra note 16, at 3, 8 (explaining the birth of Authorship); JAMES
BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION
SOCIETY 116 (1997); see generally, MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS, THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT
(1993) (explaining the Gordian Knot between Authorship and property right since the former
inception).
90
Brainyquote,
Life
Itself
is
a
Quotation,
BRAINYQUOTE,
https://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/jorge_luis_borges_183425 (last visited June 18, 2022).
91 See generally Woodmansee & Jaszi, supra note 16, at 3,8.
92 Woodmansee, supra note 17, at 426; Woodmansee & Jaszi, supra note 16, at 6-7; Boyle, supra
note 89, at 116 ; Borghi Maurizio, Copyright and the Commodification of Authorship in 18th and 19th
Century Europe, in OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LITERATURE 339-41 (2018); see Orit
Fischman-Afori, Copyright Law in Historical Perspective: Old Wine in New Bottles, LAW &
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 321 (Michael Birnhack & Niva Elkin Koren, eds. 2011) [Hebrew]
(focusing on the privilege system pre - Copyright Law).
93 Borghi, supra note 92, at 341.
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and the printer and the public.94 What happens from the privilege to the intellectual
property system is a change of perspective, as a result of the principle of sales.95 While
sales had previously only concerned a non-essential facet of the author and public
relationship, it is now not only central to the relationship, but composes its totality.96
Although the Enlightenment's philosophers preached for the supreme secular
values of pure reason and rationality to release humanity, those firm dogmas are
heavily knotted with their opposite target, an absolute obedience in the private
sphere. 97 Kant, whose ideas still dominate copyright paradigms, frames his
Enlightenment ideology as "[a]rgue as much as you please, but obey!" 98 This is his
suggested compromise between the public use of one's reason, that must be free at all
times, and the need to abide by the rules.99 Kant saw no contradiction between the
private use of reason, that may frequently be narrowly restricted and the progress of
enlightenment.100 Although, Kant admitted
Thus we observe here as elsewhere in human affairs, in which almost
everything is paradoxical, a surprising and unexpected course of
events: a large degree of civic freedom appears to be of advantage to
the intellectual freedom of the people, yet at the same time it
establishes insurmountable barriers.101
He firmly believed in the inevitable progress regarding the sovereign of his time,
Frederick the Great, as enabling his subjects to use their own reason in religious
matters.102
94 Id. at 342. The second (author-publisher) is a contract, and specifically a contract based on a
mandate. The third relationship (publisher- public) is also a speech, but in this case the words are not
those of the “speaker.” The publisher speaks only “in the name of the author.” His or her action consists
in conducting a business on behalf of the author and enjoys all the advantages that he or she
legitimately can from this negotiation. The final relationship is between the publisher and the printer,
and this is a contract of work done.
95 Id. at 346.
96 Id.
97 Immanuel Kant, What Is Enlightenment?, COLUMBIA (Mary C. smith, trans. 2021)
http://www.columbia.edu/acis/ets/CCREAD/etscc/kant.html.
98 Id.
99 Id.

In some affairs affecting the interest of the community a certain [governmental]
mechanism is necessary in which some members of the community remain passive.
This creates an artificial unanimity which will serve the fulfillment of public
objectives, or at least keep these objectives from being destroyed. Here arguing is
not permitted: one must obey.
Id.
Id.
102 Kant, supra note 99:
100
101

When we ask, are we now living in an enlightened age? the answer is, No, but we
live in an age of enlightenment. As matters now stand it is still far from true that
men are already capable of using their own reason in religious matters confidently
and correctly without external guidance. Still, we have some obvious indications
that the field of working toward the goal [of religious truth] is now opened. What is
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Horkheimer and Adorno saw Enlightenment as mass deception, coining the
famous idiom of "The Culture Industry," while denying Kantian schematism, as a
"false clarity". 103 The attempt to analyze what Enlightenment’s is in a broader sense
than its inception in the eighteen century, is best explained by the Enlightenment’s
preliminary hubris that replaced the absolute religious dogma into the dogma of
rationalism and reason. 104 Thus, totalitarianism lies at the bottom of the conceptual
premise of an absolute truth. Rationalism started as a tool to control the world but
transformed to control and suppress humanity itself. 105 The Enlightenment notion of
“instrumental” reason turned individuals to be mere species, identical to one another
and mere components in the mechanism of totalitarian bureaucracy, which sees all
human beings as numbers.106
The Enlightenment’s unifying principle that sees all different components as the
basis of a single principle is easily understood in its exclusive concept of authorship:
one transcendental truth operates in binary language: If one is crowned to be "[t]he
Author," then no one else is entitled to authorship.107 If one genius is the sole proprietor
of originality, then there is no inspiration for others, but plagiarism. Enlightenment
romantic perception of a sole and exclusive author go hand in hand with the Ten
Commandments vocabulary while excluding postmodern art practice, as manifested
by artist Jeff Koons, or sampling, looping, mashing, and hip- hop music: "[t]hou shalt
not steal."108
more, the hindrances against general enlightenment or the emergence from selfimposed nonage are gradually diminishing. In this respect this is the age of the
enlightenment and the century of Frederick [the Great].
Horkheimer & Adorno, supra note 32, at XVII ("false clarity is only another name for myth.”).
MAX HORKHEIMER & THEODOR ADORNO, THE CONCEPT OF ENLIGHTENMENT IN DIALECTIC OF
ENLIGHTENMENT 4 (1947). "For the Enlightenment, only what can be encompassed by unity has the
status of an existent or an event; its ideal is the system from which everything and anything follows.
Its rationalist and empiricist versions do not differ on that point."
105 Id. at 9.
103
104

Each human being has been endowed with a self of his or her own, different from
all others, so that it could all the more surely be made the same. But because that
self never quite fitted the mold, enlightenment throughout the liberalistic period
has always sympathized with social coercion. The unity of the manipulated
collective consists in the negation of each individual and in the scorn poured on the
type of society which could make people into individuals.
106 Id. at 4. "For the Enlightenment, anything which cannot be resolved into numbers, and
ultimately into one, is illusion.”
107 See generally Jessica D. Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990); Olufunmilayo
B. Arewa, The Freedom to Copy: Copyright, Creation, and Context, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 477, 480-82,
488 (2007).
108 Rogers v. Koons, 751 F. Supp. 474, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff’d, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992)
(finding copyright infringement by "String of Puppies" sculpture by Koons in his successful “Banality
Show”, that reproduced photographic image of German Shepherd puppies in photograph taken by
Rogers entitled "Puppies."); See also SIMON STOKES, ART & COPYRIGHT 22 (2003); Grand Upright
Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 182, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (one of the first cases
to deal with digital sampling, begins with the phrase, ‘Thou shalt not steal.’); Bridgeport Music v.
Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 801 n.12 (6th Cir. 2005); in contrast, see Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d
244, 250-59 (2nd Cir. 2006). The court reached an opposite decision for a similar appropriative practice
to enthusiastic scholars' acclaim. Compare to Peter Jaszi, Is There Such a Thing as Postmodern
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2. Copyright Miscellaneous Paradigms and Publicity Right
Gordon and Bone categorize the different approaches to intellectual property law
as moral and instrumental.109 According to the moral approach
IP laws recognize the special claims of creators to exclude others from
their creations, either as a means of protecting their personhood or
their financial and spiritual autonomy, or in recognition of their selfownership, and the entitlement this gives them to exclude others from
the things they labor to create. According to this reasoning, recognizing
and protecting IP is primarily a matter of morality.110
In copyright law, other scholars divide the aforementioned quote into
Lockean/Labor Approach that Gordon and Bone describe as the entitlement to
IP due to labor invested in its creation, and the personhood approach that
protects financial and spiritual autonomy.111
The instrumental approach to IP law is explained by Gordon and Bone as a matter
"of expediency, and of the utility or convenience of IP rights as means of securing
certain socially and economically desirable ends.” 112 Regarding copyright law, no
wonder they refer to the Incentive Approach, as it is the dominant approach in the
United States.113
Publicity right legal infrastructure is a blurry issue. Tan justifies publicity right
legal infrastructure by using four different classifications: the Lockean/Labor
Approach, the restitution paradigm of unjust enrichment Approach, the Incentive
Approach for enhancing creativity, and the economic Utilitarian Approach. 114
However, Richard Posner suggests miscellaneous categories such as unjust
enrichment Approach and the Incentive Approach.115 Kwall has opined that: “[i]t has
been said that the right of publicity promotes the societal interests of ‘fostering
creativity, safeguarding the individual’s enjoyment of the fruits of her labors,
Copyright?, 12 TULANE J. OF TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 105, 116, 118, 120 (2009) (nevertheless, there is
room for a doubt whether one swallow makes a summer).
109 Wendy J. Gordon & Robert, G. Bone, Copyright, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & ECONOMICS
(1999) 189, https://reference.findlaw.com/lawandeconomics/1610-copyright.pdf.
110 Dreyfuss & Pila, supra note 88, at 3.
111 See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 288-96 (1985); see generally Margaret
Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982).
112 Gordon & Bone, supra note 109, at 189.
113 Tushnet, supra note 88, at 102:
[i]ncentive theory, indeed, is a notable contributor to the metastasis of the right of
publicity in American law, despite the empirical dubiousness of the claims that
celebrities need economic incentives in the form of control over all commercial uses
of their identities. In intellectual property law, “if value, then right,” is
unfortunately not only a realist criticism, but also a never-ending threat.
Tan, supra note 15, at 930-33, 936.
Id. at 936 (quoting RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 30-31 (1986)).
Ultimately, "Richard Posner suggests that private property rights give rise to ‘dynamic’ and ‘static’
benefits. The former incentivizes productive investments because of the assurance that people will be
able to reap what they sow, while the latter promotes efficient use of scarce resources.”
114
115
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preventing consumer deception, and preventing unjust enrichment.’"116 In addition to
the various approaches, the creative Incentive approach, the Lockean/Labor Approach,
the personhood approach, and the unjust enrichment approach, the trademark
approach, as originally meant to avoid consumer confusion, is an important component
of the aforementioned amalgamation.117
Madow typically abides by Gordon and Bone's classification in his seminal
criticism of publicity right legal infrastructure.118 Namely, the moral arguments for
publicity rights that include the Lockean/Labor approach119and the unjust enrichment
approach120 rather than the umbrella of the economic arguments for publicity right
that include the incentives argument and the economic Utilitarian Approach. 121 In
addition, he complies with Kwall's analysis and adds consumer protection arguments
for publicity rights.122 As I argue in this section, it makes sense to locate unauthorized
celebrity appropriation under trademark law. Not only was it originally located under
the wrong intellectual property right (i.e.: copyright law), but the legal outcome of
misappropriation is contradictory under each discipline. Regardless of theoretical
nuances, one regretful premise dominates them all: the celebrity is granted sole and
exclusive authorship at the expense of the public that keeps creating the celebrity’s
image in accordance with the monolithic conception of authorship, as inherited from
the Enlightenment era.
a. The Utilitarian/Incentive Approach and Publicity Right
As Samuel Johnson said: “[n]o man but a blockhead ever wrote, except for
money."123 Johnson reverberates copyright's adjudication that follows this approach. 124
In regard to the philosophy behind Article I, Section 8 Clause 8 of the United Stated
Constitution, the Supreme Court has held the Incentive Approach to be embedded in
its core.125

116 Kwall, supra note 13, at 54. Kwall can be considered one of the most enthusiastic advocates of
publicity right.
117 See Madow, supra note 10, at 229-38 (focusing on the trademark approach, in comparison to
the Incentive approach, the Lockean/Labor Approach and the unjust enrichment approach, as
discussed.) See also id. at 179-225.
118 See generally id.
119 Id. at 182-96.
120 Id. at 196-205.
121 Madow, supra note 10, at 206-25.
122 Id. at 228-38.
123 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 584 (1994).
124 See Rebecca Tushnet, User-Generated Discontent: Transformation in Practice, 31 COLUM. J.L.
& ARTS 101, 106 (2008). "The drive to assimilate every creative act to the formal market economy is a
mistake both of fact and of value. Money isn’t everything, and it can prove destructive to particular
creative practices."
125 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); see also Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken,
422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975). The Supreme Court claims that the main purpose of copyright is to “secure
a fair return for an ‘author’s’ creative labor” by creating this incentive “to stimulate artistic creativity
for the general public good."
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The gist of the Incentive approach, as summed up by Gordon and Bone, "is to
provide incentives for new production at fairly low transaction costs." 126 In reference
to other aforementioned grounds for "if value/then right" in copyright law, they base
the economic argument for copyright "on the idea that works of authorship are quasipublic goods plagued with the usual free-rider and monopoly problems associated with
non-excludability and inexhaustibility."127 Accordingly, they interpret copyright law’s
toolkit as a vehicle to enhance this approach.128 Therefore, copyright law's constraints,
such as its limited duration, the fair use doctrine, and the idea/expression dichotomy,
all serve "to reduce deadweight loss and other costs within a larger structure that
creates incentives." 129 As the Incentive Approach is still dominant in copyright
lawsuits’ adjudications it would be helpful to cite her seven “commandments”, that,
“when present together, make the strongest economic case for copyright”.130 Therefore:
(1) The cost of independent creation is very high.
(2) A second party is able to copy the creation from its originator at a cost
lower than the cost of independent creation.
(3) These copies are perfect substitutes for the originator’s product, being
identical to the originator’s product in regard to all characteristics that affect
consumer preferences. Such characteristics include, inter alia: quality,
reliability, number and quality of distribution networks, authenticity and
associational value and support services provided in connection with the
product.
(4) Consumers perceive the two products to be perfect substitutes.
(5) The difference between the cost of copying and the cost of independent
creation is high enough that the price the copyist charges will be 200 –
significantly less than the price the originator would have to charge in order
to recoup his costs of independent creation.
(6) In the absence of an opportunity to recoup the costs of independent
creation, no one will invest in creative activity.

126 Gordon & Bone, supra note 109, at 189. In their terminology, the term "costs" refers to
Copyright generates costs, that fall into four categories: (1) monopoly pricing; (2) chilling of future
creativity; (3) transaction costs of licensing; (4) costs of administration and enforcement. Id. at 194.
127 Id. at 191.
128 Id. at 189.
129 Id. at 189., see generally Neil Weinstock Netanel, Israeli Fair Use from an American
Perspective, CREATING RIGHTS: READINGS IN COPYRIGHT LAW 377 (Michael Birnhack, Guy Pessach,
eds., 2009) [Hebrew] (explaining the implications of this approach on fair use doctrine, ending in
diminishing it into a narrowly interpreted defense that fails to incorporate freedom of speech).
130 Netanel, supra note 129, at 394. Guy Pessach, Justifying Copyright Law, 31 HEBREW UNIV .
L. REV. 359, 361-68 (2000) [Hebrew]. Pessach points out that a major part of the current legal system
leans on new developments of the utilitarian/incentive approach, as partially derivative of the
economic approach to the law. See also Zemer, supra note 68, at 314; Gordon & Bone, supra note 126,
at 199.
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(7) The independent creator can recoup her costs only by means of selling or
licensing copies and that in doing so she has no effective recourse to price
discrimination.131
The Incentive Approach as adapted to the persona means that her image is so
unique and exclusive that it will incentivize her to maximize her investment in it.132 A
related line of argument, advanced by Posner and others, justifies the right of publicity
as a mechanism for promoting allocative efficiency. 133 The ample criticism of this
approach focuses on the core question; why should we incentivize fame altogether? 134
Not only does our society let fame take the upper hand regardless of the manner of its
creation, but it ignores the fair share due to the public in persona authorship,
rendering the latter with consideration she does not deserve. Consequently, this
theory collapses under its own premise: creativity was never done solely for money,
and the Gordian note created between value (including dubious one) and right does not
explain why it should be a strong IP right.135

Gordon & Bone, supra note 126, at 199-200 (notes in brackets omitted).
See David E. Shipley, Publicity Never Dies; It Just Fades Away: The Right of Publicity and
Federal Preemption, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 673, 681 (1981). "Protecting the right of publicity provides
incentive for performers to make the economic investments required to produce performances
appealing to the public." See also Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 441 (Cal. 1979) (Bird,
C.J., dissenting). “[P]roviding legal protection for the economic value in one’s identity against
unauthorized commercial exploitation creates a powerful incentive for expending time and resources
to develop the skills or achievements prerequisite to public recognition.” See also Joshua L. Simmons
& Miranda D. Means, Split Personality: Constructing a Coherent Right of Publicity Statute, ABA
(2018), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/intellectual_property_law/publications/landslide/201718/may-june/split-personality/.
133 Madow supra note 10, at 178; William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis
of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 331-32 (1989) (Posner & Landes as the great advocators of
the Incentive approach); compare with Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of Desire: Fair Use and
Marketplace Assumptions, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513, 515-17 (2009), claiming that "[i]magination is
a renewable resource. Fan creators, realizing this, reject the economy of scarcity and excludability
that animates mainstream copyright discourse." Id. at 529.
134 See generally Lemley, supra note 15; JENNIFER E. ROTHMAN , THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY ,
PRIVACY REIMAGINED FOR A PUBLIC WORLD 101 (2018). “If the right of publicity incentivizes anything,
it is not clear that it is incentivizing anything we might wish to encourage;” Id., at 101. See also Stacey
L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the Right of Publicity Can Learn from Trademark Law, 58 STAN.
L. REV. 1161, 1187-88 (2006) (where Rothman repeats Dogan and Lemley’s argumentation).
131
132

135 Madow, supra note 10, at 214 (noting that the real incentive to fame has very little to do with
publicity right as there are powerful noneconomic motivations to excellence and achievement, such as
fame in itself). See generally ERIC VON HIPPEL, FREE INNOVATION 10-11, 152 (2017) (proving that
creativity has very little to do with financial incentives). Rebecca Tushnet, supra note 124, at 109
(arguing against the Incentive approach as the be all and end all of copyright law):

First, by its very independence from the incentives of formal markets,
noncommerciality signals the presence of expression tied to a creator’s personhood,
which deserves special consideration in any analysis of fair use that is sensitive to
free speech concerns. Second, the market changes what it swallows: the proposition
that all these forms of creativity could persist in a world in which the formal,
monetized market was everywhere is empirically mistaken.
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This "inner circle" criticism, namely, questioning the incentive theory from within,
is best demonstrated by the controversial issue of publicity right as a posthumous right
seen through the lens of Shaw Family Archives Ltd. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc.136 Who controls
Marilyn Monroe’s post mortem image, which is still the quarry of many living
celebrities?137 In Shaw Family Archives Ltd. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc. Marilyn Monroe, LLC
(“MMLLC”), an entity created by Monroe’s estate to control the intellectual property
interests conferred to the beneficiaries of the residuary clause in Monroe’s will,
commenced an action against Shaw Family Archives, LLC (“Shaw”), claiming Shaw
had violated Indiana’s Right of Publicity Act, by selling products bearing the likeness
and image of Marilyn Monroe and licenses to use images and likenesses of Monroe on
commercial products. Principals of Shaw claimed to own the copyright to various iconic
images of Monroe.
The Publicity Act, enacted in 1994 in Indiana, created a descendible and
transferable right of publicity extending 100 years after a testator’s death. 138 The
Publicity Act applies to acts or events occurring in Indiana, regardless of the decedent
celebrity’s domicile.139 The plaintiff claimed that Monroe’s posthumous publicity rights
passed to her through the residuary clause of her will.140 However, Shaw asserted that
Monroe, a possible domiciliary of either California or New York, but not of Indiana,
could not devise publicity rights she did not own at the time of her death since no
Publicity Act had yet been enacted in Indiana or either state of possible domicile. 141
The New York Southern District Court held that because California statute post-dated
Marilyn Monroe's death, she had no celebrity rights under California law to bequeath
at her death. 142 The ever-growing myth of our fantasies and desires, that keep
flourishing after Marilyn Monroe's death, does so without the incentive of a
posthumous intellectual property right. Likewise, while still alive, Monroe amply
contributed to our cultural life with no publicity right in her arsenal. 143
Nowadays, reality is more complex. The internet mechanism enhances ever
growing “user innovation[s]” in a vast number of fields. 144 Moreover, "today,
commercial publishers and popular authors are increasingly understanding that fan
fiction is a commercially valuable free complement to their intellectual property, and
so increasingly seek to support fan fiction rather than suppress it". 145 Thus, the
136 Shaw Family Archives Ltd. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 2d 309, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2007);
see also Savare, supra note 20, at 52 (illustrating many states, including California, recognize a
posthumous right of publicity, ranging from 10 years to 100, whereas other states, such as New York,
do not afford any posthumous rights).
137 See Madonna Blows Chunks, Madonna Regularly Ripped off Marilyn Monroe, MADONNA
BLOWS CHUNKS: AN ANTI-MADONNA SITE https://mbcantim.wordpress.com/madonna-is-unoriginalindex-page/madonna-regularly-ripped-off-marilyn-monroe/ (last visited August 27, 2021) (implying
Madonna stole her style from Marilyn Monroe by comparing numerous pictures of the two).
138 Ind. Code § 32-36-1-8 (2019).
139 Ind. Code § 32-36-1-1 (2019).
140 Shaw Family Archives Ltd., 486 F. Supp. 2d at 313.
141 Id. at 313-14.
142 Id. at 314-20.
143 Id. The outer criticism, common to all justification for publicity right legal infrastructure is
the extra power granted to her as a vehicle of cultural obstruction.
144 Pamela D. Morrison et al., Determinants of User Innovation and Innovation Sharing in a Local
Market, 46 MGMT. SCI. 1513, 1514, 1516-7, 1519, 1522, 1526 (2000).
145 Von Hippel, supra note 135, at 152.
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dominant Incentive approach is turned upside down by the field itself. During the
Game of Throne’s prime, Travis M. Andrews estimated that it "was pirated more than
a billion times — far more times than it was watched legally." 146 Yet, the show's
director, David Petrarca, claims that "these unauthorized downloads actually do more
good than harm" as they create the "cultural buzz" the show needs for survival. 147
Namely, the buzz will cause more people to subscribe to HBO. 148 It is argued that
HBO's overly exclusive policy causes limited availability that breeds pirates.149
The recent case of Bel-Air (film) is enlightening. The four-minute film, created by
Morgan Cooper, is based on the 1990's “Fresh Prince of Bel-Air” sitcom.150 The film
envisioned the sitcom from a darker and more dramatic approach.151 It went viral
when uploaded to YouTube on March 10, 2019.152 Will Smith, the original sitcom star,
decided to produce the film with Cooper as director, co-writer, and executive producer.
Major streaming corporations, such as NBC's Peacock and HBO Max were bidding for
the promising project, with the former winning.153 Hardly three years have passed
since "Will Smith Calls Dramatic Fan-Made ‘Bel-Air’ Trailer “Brilliant” till Bel-Air
premieres planned to air it on February 13th, directly after the Super Bowl.154 This
fairy tale came true thanks to the 'Deus ex Machina', superstar Will Smith, but could
have easily ended in a lawsuit.155 Aristotle would not have approved as he regarded
the 'Deus ex Machina' as an inferior device.156 Surely, we cannot trade our cultural
control with 'Deus ex Machina,' even if it would be considered as a superior one.
146 Travis M. Andrews, ‘Game of Thrones’ was pirated more than a billion times — far more than
it
was
watched
legally,
THE
WASH.
POST
(Sep.
8,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2017/09/08/game-of-thrones-was-piratedmore-than-a-billion-times-far-more-than-it-was-watched-legally/?variant=c44b726edf25a662
(indicating piracy numbers, as reported by the anti-piracy firm MUSO are: Episode one: 187,427,575,
Episode two: 123,901,209, Episode three: 116,027,851, Episode four: 121,719,868, Episode five:
151,569,560, Episode six: 184,913,279, Episode seven: 143,393,804 and All Episode Bundles — Season
7: 834,522).
147 Ernesto Van der Sar, Piracy Doesn’t Hurt Game of Thrones, Director Says, TORRENT FREAK
(Feb. 27, 2013), https://torrentfreak.com/piracy-doesnt-hurt-game-of-thrones-director-says-130227/.
148 Id.
149 Id. (discussing that piracy being good for business was already argued by “Heroes” and “Lost”
co-producer Jesse Alexander, half a decade ago).
150 Caroline Framke, Peacock’s Intriguing ‘Bel-Air’ Flips ‘Fresh Prince,’ and Turns Low
Expectations
Upside-Down:
TV
Review,
VARIETY
(Feb.
9,
2022),
https://variety.com/2022/tv/reviews/bel-air-fresh-prince-reboot-review-1235169374/.
151 See generally Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989). The dilemma was the film a
transformative work or a derivative unauthorized work, thus, an infringing work, is not solved by the
benevolent attitude of Will Smith, who chose the former. Ginger Rogers was not that generous as her
lawsuit against Fellini movie, Ginger and Fred, proves.
152 Andy Greene, Hilarious ‘Bel Air’ Trailer Reimagines ‘The Fresh Prince’ as a Dramatic Movie,
ROLLING STONE (Mar. 13, 2019), https://www.rollingstone.com/tv-movies/tv-movie-news/bel-airtrailer-fresh-prince-will-smith-807707/.
153 Lesley Goldberg, ‘Fresh Prince of Bel-Air’ Drama Reboot in the Works, THE HOLLYWOOD
REPORTER (Aug. 11, 2020), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/tv/tv-news/fresh-prince-bel-airdrama-reboot-works-1306799/.
154 Erica Gonzales & Bianca Betancourt, The Fresh Prince of Bel-Air Is Getting a Reboot, with a
Twist, BAZAAR (Jan. 10, 2022), https://www.harpersbazaar.com/culture/film-tv/a33584285/freshprince-bel-air-news-cast-spoilers-date/.
155 Id.; compare to Rogers, 875 F.2d at 994 (Ginger Rogers's attitude led to Rogers v. Grimaldi).
156
Aristotle,
The
Poetics
of
Aristotle,
GUTENBERG
(2008),
https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1974/1974-h/1974-h.htm#link2H_4_0017.
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b. The Lockean/Labor Approach and Publicity Right
The right of publicity in Lockean terms was phrased by its critics as "John Locke
goes to Hollywood,” or the claims of "labor" on the fruits of fame.157 For the labor-based
moral argument for publicity rights to be plausible, a commercially marketable public
image or persona must be viewed as the celebrity's own product, something that she
herself makes or creates through her own individual labor. 158 As sociological research
has proved, fame is a "relational" phenomenon.159 A person can, within the limits of
his natural talents, make himself strong or swift or learned. However, he cannot, in
this same sense, make himself famous, any more than he can make himself loved.
Fame is often conferred or withheld, just as love is, for reasons other than its own
labor. The reason one person wins universal acclaim and another does not may have
less to do with his or her intrinsic merits or accomplishments than with the needs,
interests, and purposes of his or her audience.160 Therefore, fame is created through a
"socially constructed reality" via the press and the public working out their own
anxieties and concerns, thus creating the persona and not the individual’s "labor."161
Ironically, despite the classification of the Lockean approach as the moral basis of
publicity right, the courts omit Locke's restrictions to his own theory, which was never
meant to grant unlimited IP rights.162
In terms of preventing unjust enrichment, the contest between the persona and
the unauthorized appropriator of her image is used as a doctrinal vehicle to strengthen
Lockean misunderstood approach, framed starkly as sower versus reaper, regardless
of cultural production being a constant process of reworking, recombining, and

It is therefore evident that the unravelling of the plot, no less than the complication,
must arise out of the plot itself, it must not be brought about by the 'Deus ex
Machina'—as in the Medea, or in the Return of the Greeks in the Iliad. The 'Deus
ex Machina' should be employed only for events external to the drama, —for
antecedent or subsequent events, which lie beyond the range of human knowledge,
and which require to be reported or foretold; for to the gods we ascribe the power of
seeing all things.
Madow, supra note 10, at 182.
Tali Sperber, The Right of Publicity: Clarifications and Notes on McDonald v. McDonald
(Aloniel) Ltd., 33 MISHPATIM 693, 701 (2003) [Hebrew].
159
Madow, supra note 10, at 188; compare with JOHN RODDEN, THE POLITICS OF LITERARY
REPUTATION: THE MAKING AND CLAIMING OF "ST. GEORGE" ORWELL 51 (1989).
160 Madow, supra note 10, at 188. Madow uses "merit" and "accomplishments" alike. He
demonstrates how a celebrity's public image is always the product of a complex social, if not fully
democratic, process in which the "labor" (time, money, effort) of the celebrity herself (and of the
celebrity industry, too) is but one ingredient, and not always the main one. The meanings a star's
image comes to have, and hence the "publicity values" that attach to it, are determined by what
different groups and individuals, with different needs and interests, make of it and from it, as they
use it to make sense of and construct themselves and the world.
161 See CA 8483/02 McDonald v. McDonald (Alonial) Ltd. (No. 1) [2004] IsrSC 58(4) 314
(transplanting publicity right into Israeli law.). Justice Rivlin held that property too is a socially
constructed outcome in its essence, which misled the Supreme Court to confer "the fruits of fame" on
the persona solely.
162 Zemer, supra note 68, at 317-18; Zemer, supra note 87, at 13; see also Lior Zemer, The Making
of a New Copyright Lockean, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB POL’Y 891, 919 (2006) (providing all Locke’s
restrictions on private property in detail).
157
158
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redeploying already-existing symbolic forms, sounds, narratives, and images. 163 As
Madow argues, "on this view, prohibition of a free ride "is justified to prevent unjust
gain even when it is not necessary to prevent unfair loss." 164 However, the blurry
miscellaneous theories that form persona authorship in copyright law, which morph
into publicity right, are at war with themselves. As Shipley sums up:
Distinctions between conduct actionable under a misappropriation theory
and actions giving rise to the prototypical right of publicity action are trivial.
Unjust enrichment through the conversion of hard-earned and valuable
intangible interests constitutes the remediable wrong in both situations. 165
c. The Personhood Approach and Publicity Right
The "[i]f value/then right" premise faces a challenging doctrinal shift from an
autonomy-based right, like the personhood approach, into a property right. 166 In
addition, Kantian philosophy, which was the first to recognize the author as a principal
actor in a dialogical discourse, is a rich palette of different colors. Whereas Haemmerli
interprets the right of publicity as a Kantian right that "can be more expansively
conceptualized as a property right grounded in human freedom," 167 Drassinower
formulates a work of authorship "not as a thing—whether intangible or otherwise—
but as a communicative act," thus echoing the Kantian conception of the author who
speaks to the public in his own name through her book as a visible sign of speech. 168
Kant's “Categorical Imperative”("CI") as the quintessence of his moral philosophy
is a rationality standard humankind should always follow. 169 According to this
principle, moral requirements are justified as this principle is the law of our
autonomous inner will.170 As rationality begets the “Categorical Imperative" as the end
all and be all of this moral philosophy, it renders the human will as subordinate to
rational requirements.171 Kant's Humanity Formula "states that we should never act
in such a way that we treat humanity, whether in ourselves or in others, as a means
Coombe, supra note 9, at 63.
Madow, supra note 10, at 200, (quoting JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL
LAW: HARMLESS WRONGDOING 212 (1988)).
165 Shipley, supra note 132, at 686.
166 Robert C. Post & Jennifer E. Rothman, The First Amendment and the Right(s) of Publicity,
130 YALE L.J. 86, 92 (2020). Attempting to retrieve publicity right into its starting point as a tort,
following Dean Prosser’ legacy, under which four ideal torts can be constructed: 1.the right of the
plaintiffs to control the use of their performances; 2. The right of commercial value in the plaintiff’s
identity; 3.the right of controlling the autonomy of their personality; 4. The right of dignity. However,
they admit that “justifications for barring the unauthorized use of identity presently encompass the
protection of both market based and personality-based interests." Id. at 93.
167 Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who? The Case for a Kantian Right of Publicity, 49 DUKE L.J. 383,
488 (1999).
168 Abraham Drassinower, Death in Copyright: Remarks on Duration, 99 B.U. L. Rev. 2259, 2561
(2019).
169 See generally Robert Johnson, Adam Cureton, Kant’s Moral Philosophy, Aims and Methods
of Moral Philosophy, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, (Feb. 23, 2004)
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-moral/#AimMetMor.
170 Id.
171 Id.
163
164
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only but always as an end in itself."172 Consequently, we have a duty to make the most
of our humanity and our potential talents in order to create a constantly improved
humanity and mutual “respect” for the humanity in persons as bearers of worth and
absolute value.173 Kant’s first formulation of the CI is the Formula of the Universal
Law of Nature, namely, that "you are to “act only in accordance with that maxim
through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law”.174 Kant’s
second formulation of the CI is the Humanity Formula, according to which "we should
never act in such a way that we treat humanity, whether in ourselves or in others, as
a means only but always as an end in itself." 175 The third formulation of the Categorical
Imperative is the Autonomy Formula, which frames “the Idea of the will of every
rational being as a will that legislates universal law.” 176 The goal of the Autonomy
Formula can be achieved "by putting on display the source of our dignity and worth,
our status as free rational agents who are the source of the authority behind the very
moral laws that bind us."177
The doctrinal infrastructure of the personhood approach is amplified by
Fichte, who established the ground for the conception of the author as the keystone of
authorship. 178 However, Kant's moral philosophy is still the foundation of the
personhood approach, as developed both by Hegel and Radin. Whereas Hegel, 179
granted the author the right to control her creation as the extension of her inner will,
intellectual process and individuality, Radin 180 took his philosophy further, by
creating the dichotomy between personal/commercial assets that merit different levels
of protection, each, according to their connection to our personality. According to
Radin's interpretation, the closer intellectual property is linked to the core of the
creator's personality and inner- self, the higher protection it deserves and higher
protection will follow. For Haemmerli, the Kantian system is enough to connect
freedom, personhood, property, and publicity rights as "the right to control the use of
one’s image or other objectification of identity, hence, a property right based directly
on freedom, autonomy, or personality." 181 However, those doctrines that constitute
copyright law authorship need the doctrinal mechanism to implement them in
practice. As I argue in the following chapter, the main mechanism used is false
narratives of artistic neutrality and originality.
Id. at Ch. 6.
IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 44 (1797) (discussing the
amalgamation in Kant’s philosophy between property and freedom, as the outcome of the Humanity
formula).
174 Johnson & Cureton, supra note 169, at Ch. 5.
175 Id. at Ch. 6.
176 Id. at Ch. 7.
177 Id.; see also Haemmerli, supra note 167, at 468. Haemmerli grounds her advocacy for
personhood right "as it places primary emphasis on human worth and self-determination."
178 Boyle, supra note 89, at 55.
179 See generally Paul Redding, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, T HE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PHILOSOPHY (Feb. 13, 1997), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hegel/; see also Zemer, supra note
68, at 320-21; Zemer, supra note 87, at 16 (discussing Intellectual property deriving from the
intellectual process of the creator).
180 Radin, supra note 111, at 959-60.
181 Haemmerli, supra note 167, at 421. For a contrasting argument, that "works need not be
conceived of as personal or personality-based, but rather, autonomy-based," see generally Kim TreigerBar-Am, Kant on Copyright: Rights of Transformative Authorship, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1059,
1083, 1101 (2008).
172
173
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3. Copyright Law "Evil Twins" and their Implications: The False Narratives of
Artistic Neutrality and Originality
The false narrative of Originality is not a new topic.182 The monolithic thinking of
one genius who creates "everything from nothing," armed with unprecedent
expressions, plots, or characters, springing straight from the abyss, can easily mistake
inspiration for plagiarism. However, what is classified as original depends heavily on
judges' artistic discretion, negating the other, even darker copyright law false
narrative: the false artistic neutrality narrative. As I argue in this chapter, this
Gordian note creates copyright law’s "evil twins" that, together, design its most
influential tools that were meant to balance the persona authorship and the public
domain, especially, the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use doctrine. 183
Unfortunately, the "evil twins" led to the opposite outcome of deteriorating the already
fragile balance between persona authorship and the public domain for the benefit of
the former on the expense of the latter. This chapter endeavors to find out why the
road to hell is paved with good intentions.
a. The Idea/Expression Dichotomy v. the "Scènes à Faire" and the Merger Doctrines
A crucial doctrinal tool in copyright law is the “aesthetic nondiscrimination."184
As phrased in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., "some works of genius would
be sure to miss appreciation. Their very novelty would make them repulsive until the
public had learned the new language in which their author spoke.”185 While the goal of
copyright law is to encourage creativity, either through its focus on the work itself
through the incentive approach, or on the artist, through the Labor approach and the
Personhood approach, the main point is to avoid copying, regardless of the original's
quality.186 Hence, it should be sufficient that the protected work originated from its
author.187 The connection between Enlightenment Era (i.e., Fichte, Kant, and Hegel)
monolithic vocabulary that perceived the author as the quintessence of originality, and
“aesthetic nondiscrimination" is summed up by Boyle in reference to how a creator's
182 See generally Litman, supra note 107; see also Arewa, supra note 107; Michael D. Birnhack,
A Cultural Reading: Israel's 2007 Copyright Act and the Creative Field, AUTHORING RIGHTS:
READINGS IN COPYRIGHT LAW 83, 95-96 (Michael Birnhack & Guy Pessach, eds., 2009) [Hebrew] (for
the development of originality as the central axis of the law in the Anglo- American judicial system,
and the "Droit Moral" in the continental judicial system); Lior Zemer, The Copyright Moment, 43 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 247, 288-98 (2006) (illustrating hoe even giants like Shakespeare, Mozart or Picasso
were not entirely original in their oeuvres and borrowed, to varying degrees, either from their
predecessors or their contemporaries).
183 See Gordon & Bone, supra note 109, at 189 (justifying the existence of Copyright Law's
constraints such as the ‘fair use’ doctrine and the idea/expression dichotomy, as designated "to reduce
deadweight loss and other costs within a larger structure that creates incentives”).
184 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
185 Id.
186 See Bracha, supra note 80, at 244-46 (for the development of Copyright Law perception of
"copying”).
187 See Michael D. Birnhack, Originality in Copyright Law and Cultural Control, 1 ALEY MISHPAT
347, 354 (2002) [Hebrew] (for the originality requirement by the law as implemented by a different
amalgamation and prioritization of three components: origination, labor and creativity).
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uniqueness is recognized.188 Thus, "first in great spirits, then in creative spirits, and
finally in advertising executives, expresses itself in originality of form, of
expression."189
As Yen argues, the importance of the idea/expression dichotomy lies in its ability to
prevent the unjustified expansion of copyright vis-à-vis the first Amendment, as only
original "expressions" are copyrightable, but not ideas, that may serve as a future
quarry for futuristic artists to copy. 190
Hence, the Gordian note between the idea, expression, originality, and freedom of
speech is established.191 Not only should ideas be "free as the air to common use," but
if original, they are constitutionally valueless and do not deserve copyright law
protection. 192 The Originality doctrinal note combines the dominant incentive
approach, the Enlightenment's monolithic perception of one agonized genius as the
sole component in authorship in charge of originality and the idea/expression
dichotomy.193
As Litman proves, the courts created three classifications of works under the
umbrella of idea/expression dichotomy: the systems class, directory cases, and the most
Boyle, supra note 89, at 56.
Id.
190 Alfred C. Yen, A First Amendment Perspective on the Idea/Expression Dichotomy and
Copyright in a Work's "Total Concept and Feel", 38 EMORY L.J. 393, 395 (1989); see also 17 U.S.C. §
102(b) (2022); see Sid and Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
1170 (9th Cir. 1977). "Similarly, to the extent that copyright permits the borrowing of ideas, it leaves
ample room to authors whose works do not merely repeat the expression of others, but rather add to
the "marketplace of ideas."
191 Yen, supra note 190, at 395. Yen argues, the idea/expression dichotomy
188
189

is perhaps the most important limit on the unwarranted expansion of copyright.
It operates by denying protection to the ideas which underlie copyrightable
works. Consequently, only the original "expressions" contained in these works
can actually receive copyright protection. This makes certain portions (the
"ideas") of every work freely available for others to copy. Such permitted
borrowing from copyrighted works ostensibly keeps copyright from unduly
restricting speech and running afoul of the first Amendment.
192 See Int’l News Serv. v. A.P., 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). “[T]he general
rule of law is, that the noblest of human productions— knowledge, truths ascertained, conceptions,
and ideas—become, after voluntary communication to others, free as the air to common use.” See also
Miller v. Univ. City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1368 (5th Cir. 1981); Yen, supra note 161, at 421.
"The idea/expression dichotomy theoretically limits copyright so that it prohibits only copying that is
constitutionally valueless."
193 Boyle, supra note 89, at 114:

This triad manages to make it seem that intellectual property rights are more than
just a utilitarian grant by the state, to limit the ambit of something that sounds
very much like a labor theory of property rights, and to divide the author's creation
so that the idea goes into the world of public exchange while the expression remains
the author's.
See also Woodmansee, supra note 17, at 427, 445 (focusing on copyright law infrastructure in all its
paradigms as based on an anachronistic assumption of an agonized genius, whose creativity
originated straight from the abyss and is the sole guardian of Originality); see Moldawer supra note
23, at 168-70 (focusing on direct and indirect Originality narratives in Copyright Law infrastructure).
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relevant class regarding persona–the "scènes à faire" doctrine.,194 Historically, the
concept of “scènes à faire” as “the scenes that must be done” from the audience point
of view, started much earlier in the nineteenth-century and is attributed to French
drama critic Francisque Sarcey. 195 Justice Yankwich who developed the "scènes à
faire" doctrine meant it to defend the public's expectation how a plot should be told,
thus, rendering the necessary details of a scene to be "uncopyrightable per se, as they
do not derive from a work’s author but from the scene itself."196 This thinking, that
turned the "scènes à faire" doctrine into an uncopyrightable idea, should have
strengthen both the public domain and the freedom of speech as its legal outcome.
However, as Walker demonstrates, the "scènes à faire" doctrine caused the opposite
results. 197 Other courts rephrased the doctrine as “sequences of events which
necessarily follow from a common theme." 198 The question becomes: what, then, is
considered to be "necessary" as to render a theme,199 a character,200 or a socioeconomic
background to be "uncopyrightable per se?" 201 In all the ample variety of the relevant
adjudication the same vocabulary recurs: "must," "necessary," "inevitably," and the
like. However, those judgements depend on cultural nexuses, personal upbringing, and
taste. Aristotle had a clear vision that what becomes a tragedy versus what becomes a
comedy are separate genres.202 That did not deter Shakespeare from including the
porter hilarious soliloquy amidst Macbeth 203 or to portray a future king as a
scoundrel 204 in his vision of life as the amalgamation of the sublime with the
ludicrous.205
Justice Yankwich often quoted the Cain ruling can be questioned in order to
demonstrate how intuition becomes a matter of law (the items in the parenthesis are
not part of the integral text):
194 Litman, supra note 107, at 983-90. Cain v. Univ. Pictures Co., 47 F. Supp. 1013, 1017 (S.D.
Cal. 1942). Judge Yankwich developed the "scènes à faire" doctrine which morphed to be the dominant
approach for the "film cases" class.
195 Leslie A. Kurtz, Copyright: The Scenes a Faire Doctrine, 41 FLA. L. REV. 7-81 (1989).
196 Cain, 47 F. Supp. at 1017; see Litman, supra note 107, at 985-87 (explaining ample
adjudication in the "film cases" class pre – Cain ruling, that rejected infringement suits on the grounds
of the plaintiff work described as "trite", "stock", "common" or "a cliché").
197 Walker, supra note 18, at 461-63.
198 Reyher v. Children’s Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 1976).
199 Zambito v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 613 F. Supp. 1107, 1112 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (for the theme
of the hidden treasure in a cave and its necessary requirements); see generally CBS Broad. Inc. v.
A.B.C., Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20258 *22 (S.D. N.Y. Jan. 13, 2003) (for what a reality show about
survival must include, i.e., a host and a generic setting as well).
200 Brown v. Perdue, 2005 W.L. 1863673 *8 (S.D.N.Y, 2005); aff’d 79 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1958 (2d Cir.
2006); cert. denied 127 S.Ct. 580 (2006); Green v. Lindsey, 855 F. Supp. 469, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Rice
v. Fox Broadcasting Company et al., 330 F.3d 1170, 1176 (2003).
201 Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 49-50 (2d Cir. 1986) (for how a crime-ridden and
poverty-stricken urban neighborhood should be portrayed, including the "inevitable" elements, such
as: bribery, prostitution, purse-snatching, and neighborhood hostility to law enforcers). Shur-Ofry,
supra note 84, at 77. (This creates the classification of "generic components" and "generic elements."
However, a different classification does not provide us with any real criterion, as to what "must" be
included in a work to render it as a cliché, i.e.: an uncopyrightable idea.)
202 See generally, Aristotle, supra note 156.
203 William Shakespeare, The Tragedy of Macbeth, act 2, sc. 3.
204 See generally William Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part 2.
205 See ERICH AUERBACH, MIMESIS: THE REPRESENTATION OF REALITY IN WESTERN LITERATURE
312 (1974) (for the origins of philosophy).
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The other small details, on which stress is laid, such as the playing of the
piano (why not the violin?), the prayer, the hunger motive (why should it be
the only possible motive?), as it called, are inherent in the situation itself (how
about the music stopping altogether?). They are what the French call " scènes
à faire ". Once (is every second attempt turns the first into a cliché?) having
placed two persons in a church during a big storm, it was inevitable (why?)
that incidents like these and others which are, necessarily, associated (what
makes a necessary association? The causation rhetoric is phrased as an axiom)
with such a situation should force themselves upon the writer (is writing a
matter of choice or of an enforcement?) in developing the theme (can an artist
develop a forced formula? Isn't it an oxymoron?).206
Ironically, Justice Yankwich's article about originality, the opposite of the scènes
à faire doctrine, brings us no further because, at best, the lesson learnt is Justice
Yankwich's artistic taste.207 The "plot thickens" as not only the narrative of “aesthetic
nondiscrimination" is debunked by the courts, but the very concept of what constitutes
a copyrightable expression versus an uncopyrightable idea is evasive.208 The more an
uncopyrightable idea that expands to a general "look and feel," as a question of the
judges' “aesthetic discrimination" and instinct, morphs into what it should have never
meant to be: a copyrightable expression, a lesser defense to freedom of speech, thus,
rubbing the public domain's ever diminishing quarry.209 Ironically, Landes and Posner
the great advocates of the incentive theory, which claims the idea/expression
dichotomy as an important balance between authorship and the public domain, argue
that the artistic genres of Abstract Expressionism do not deserve copyright protection
as Appropriation Art has been described “as getting the hand out of art and putting
the brain in" and namely, turning expressions into ideas. 210
The merger doctrine, a "sisterly" doctrinal theory attempts to back the
idea/expression dichotomy.211 Although the “scènes à faire” doctrine and the merger
206
207

(1951).

Cain, 47 F. Supp. at 1017 (the additional text in italics is not part of the integral text).
Leon R. Yankwich, Originality in the Law of Intellectual Property, 11 F.R.D. 457, 466-85

208 Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1109 (9th Cir. 1970) (the court found
similarities between the plaintiff's cards and the defendant's because they shared the same "total
concept and feel."); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Pro., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1163
(9th Cir. 1977) (holding that McDonald is liable for infringement because her show had the "total
concept and feel" of the plaintiff's); see also Yen, supra note 190, at 405, 418; Yen refers to Manes,
Who'll Think of Suing What Next?, PC MAG., May 26, 1987, at 180-82, who suggests that the "total
concept and feel" ruling supports a hypothetical suit by the estate of Marilyn Monroe against the pop
star Madonna, for the latter appropriating the "total concept and feel" of the former. Id. at 418;
Walker, supra note 18, at 446 (claiming that practically, scènes à faire has come to have two different
meanings, both retain the same dilemma of the judges' “aesthetic discrimination", using the same
vocabulary of "must" for the hereinafter first stated meaning and "stock, standard and cliché" for the
second. Thus: "(i) [c]ertain scenes are uncopyrightable because they must be included in a given
context, as “identical situations call for identical scenes;” and (ii) certain elements within a work are
not protected because they are stock or standard to the treatment of a particular subject (i.e., they are
clichéd.)).
209 Id.
210 WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW 254, 260 (2003).
211 Pamela Samuelson, Reconceptualizing Copyright's Merger Doctrine, 63 J. COPYRIGHT
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doctrine were sometimes confused in courts, as Fiore and Rogoway clarify, "the merger
doctrine is implicated when there are so few ways of expressing an idea that the
expression and the corresponding idea have merged to become one and the same." 212
Although easily understood in technical matters, it is no wonder the merger doctrine
gained the unpromising description as “the doctrine that is not” in William Patry’s
treatise.213 The Gordian note to originality is more convincing through the merger
doctrine's lenses, as only way to express an idea renders originality into an oxymoron.
214 However, no matter how we distinguish artful vis-à-vis functional components, the
former requires aesthetic nondiscrimination, in contrast to copyright law narrative.
The idea/expression dichotomy, even if titled as the artful, still blocks the freedom of
expression by overpowering the “idea” scope at the expense of the “expression." 215
Although Samuelson describes the scènes à faire doctrine and the merger doctrines as
contrasting, their outcomes are the same. 216
b. The Fair use doctrine
Fair use, which was described by Lessig's famous quote as "the right to hire a
lawyer" for its evasiveness and unpredictability, is posing a harder yoke on the false
narratives of copyright law, specifically on aesthetic nondiscrimination and
originality. 217 Although, transformative use, as the quintessence of fair use, was
meant by the courts to establish the right balance between creativity and the First

SOC'Y U.S.A. 417, 442 (2016).
Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068, 1082 (9th Cir. 2000); Daniel A. Fiore & Samuel
E. Rogoway, Reality Check, LOS ANGELES LAWYER 34, 36 (July-Aug. 2005).
213 Apple Comp., Inc. v. Franklin Comp.Corp., F. Supp. 812, 823 (E.D. Pa. 1982), rev’d, 714 F.2d
1240, 1253 (3d Cir. 1983); WILLIAM PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT LAW, § 4:46 (2015).
214 Id. at 438-42. For Samuelson, five types of mergers: a fact/expression merger doctrine, a
law/expression merger doctrine, a process/expression merger doctrine, a system/expression merger,
and the most relevant and tricky classification to our discourse: the art/ functionality merger.
215 Id. at 461. "Curiously missing from the rationales that courts have used to justify ruling in
favor of merger defenses are the freedom of expression interests of subsequent creators."
216 Id. at 448.
212

The merger and scènes à faire doctrines are, however, distinct in their essential
character. With merger, the core issue is whether there are, practically speaking,
more than a few alternative ways to express particular ideas or functions. The core
issue in scènes à faire cases, by contrast, is whether certain elements in common
between two works are indispensable in works of that kind, common in the
industry, or otherwise to be expected in works of that kind.
217 LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY LAW AND THE LOCK
DOWN CULTURE CONTROL CREATIVITY 287 (2004); see NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT'S
PARADOX 169-70, 190-91 (2008) (for fair use as the main vehicle of copyright law to create the desirable
balance between Authorship and freedom of expression intrinsically, thus, prima facie, rendering the
First Amendment protection unnecessary). See also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 190, 221 (2003);
Roy Export Co. Establishment v. CBS, Inc., 672 F.2d 1095, 1099 (2d Cir. 1982). “No circuit that has
considered the question has ever held that the First Amendment provides a privilege in the copyright
field distinct from the accommodation embodied in the ‘fair use’ doctrine.”
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Amendment, 218 the outcome merely proved that the marriage of aesthetic
nondiscrimination and originality, as the false narratives of the law, begot the very
phenomenon transformative use was meant to avoid: the closure of the cultural public
common, especially in regard to publicity right. That evolved through the parody/satire
dichotomy,219 the courts' interpretation of the commercial use component in fair use
doctrine and the hybrid media, which makes the distinction between news,
entertainment, and commerce almost impossible.220
As John Tehranian demonstrates, the dynamic evolvement of derivative work in
copyright law created a new, total idea of originality, unknown before, and changed
the balance between the author and the public domain, for the benefit of the former at
the expense of the latter. Once works that were previously unprotected, such as
translations, evolved to be classified as derivative works, they were no more part of the
public domain. 221 This constantly changing balance between authorship and the
public domain tells the history of copyright law.222 To borrow Boyle's colorful slogan:
"The holes matter as much as the cheese." 223 As Bohannan & Hovenkamp
demonstrate, works previously considered as independent works of authorship, such
as an unauthorized translation of Uncle Tom's Cabin, evolved under the new balance
as the questionable class of derivative works that lost their immunity to copyright
infringement lawsuits. 224 Hence, as what once was permitted, is forbidden under
current law, unless recognized as “fair use."225 In addition, the fair-use legal status in
the United States has become too many things to too many people, shifting from a
defense into a privilege. 226 Whereas some scholars treat fair use as a question of
substantive law rather than as a question of remedies, others regard fair use as a
doctrine that tries to define the boundary between the commercial incentives secured
by copyright and the right to free expression protected by the First Amendment, or
218 Pierre N., Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV . L. REV. 1105, 1111 (1990); Netanel,
supra note 217, at 398.
219 See generally Keller & Tushnet, supra note 20 (for the outcome of parody/satire dichotomy in
American adjudication).
220 See Savare, supra note 20, at 53 (claiming the issue of the "hybrid speech" to be the most
complicated and disputed in copyright claims in regard publicity right).
221 John Tehranian, Towards a Critical IP Theory: Copyright, Consecration, and Control, 2012
BYU L. REV. 1237, 1245, 1249-50 (2012) (focusing on how the mechanism of derivative-works
protection created a new cultural distinction and highbrow/lowbrow norm). See also Arewa, supra note
107, at 520 (for the originality false narrative); Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201, 206-7 (C.C.E.D. Pa.
1853) (deciding case according to the Copyright Act of Feb 3, 1831) (for translation as an unprotected
work pre the derivative work evolvement).
222 Litman, supra note 107, at 978.
223 JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE MIND 65-71 (2008).
224 Christina Bohannan & Herbert J. Hovenkamp, IP and Antitrust: Reformation and Harm, 51
B.C. L. REV. 905, 976, 977 (2010); Stowe, 23 F. Cas. at 206-7.
225 Sonia Katyal et al., Fair Use: Its Application, Limitations and Future, 17 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1017, 1077-78 (2007). Hugh Hansen defines transformative use as a
derivative work, for which there is a right.
226 CCH Canadian Ltd. et al. v. Law Society of Upper Canada [2004] S.C.R. 339 (Can.) (focusing
on the evasiveness of fair use as its core is best demonstrated through a so-called promising
adjudication. The Canadian Supreme Court held that "the fair dealing exception, like other exceptions
in the Act, is a user's right."); see also ROSEMARY J. COOMBE ET AL., INTRODUCING DYNAMIC FAIR
DEALING: CREATING CANADIAN DIGITAL CULTURE 9-12 (2014) (noting that the access copyright that
decrees payable uses out the scope of fair dealing, together with the Copyright Modernization Act Bill
C-11 "digital locks" enhancement, leave users in the same legal ambivalence).
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lament its failure to do so. 227 Hence, while Abraham Drassinower, profoundly
influenced by Postmodernist vocabulary, advocates fair use as users' rights rather than
as mere exceptions, Huge Hansen defines transformative use as a derivative work, for
which there is a right.228
Not only is the classification of fair use as a right or a defense blurry, but it
morphed into at least five different tests where commerciality combats with
creativity.229 Namely: the transformative use test, the predominant use test, the actual
malice test, the relatedness/restatement test, the ad-hoc test and the Rogers test.230 As
I argued elsewhere, the hidden leitmotiv is the complex concept of transformative use
227 Compare Michael J. Madison, Rewriting Fair Use and the Future of Copyright Reform, 23
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 391, 405 (2005) (treating fair use as a question of substantive law rather
than as a question of remedies) with Hansen, supra note 225, at 1077-78. Hansen’s perception of
transformative use as a derivative work, for which there is a right. Compare Aiken, supra note 225,
at 1020 (regarding fair use as a doctrine that tries to define the boundary between the commercial
incentives secured by copyright and the right to free expression protected by the First Amendment)
with Jacqueline Deborah D. Lipton & John Tehranian, Derivative Works 2.0: Reconsidering
Transformative Use in the Age of Crowdsourced Creation, 109 NW. UNIV. L REV. 383, 415-16 (2015)
(demonstrating how the fair use doctrinee fails to reach such definition).
228 ABRAHAM DRASSINOWER, TAKING USER RIGHTS SERIOUSLY IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE
FUTURE OF CANADIAN COPYRIGHT LAW (2005). "The invocation of user rights as central to copyright
is also an evocation of the author as user—an affirmation of the intertextuality of creation." See also
Hansen, supra note 225, at 1077-78 (Hansen’s view on the issue.).
229 See Kwall, supra note 13, at 1356-64 (discussing the different classifications of far use tests);
Matthew Savare & John Wintermute, A Haystack in a Hurricane: Right of Publicity Doctrine
Continues to Clash with New Media, 32 COMPUT. & INTERNET L. 1, 7 (2015); Moldawer, supra note
23, at 174-76.
230 See Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 25 Cal. 4th 387, 404 (2001) (explaining the
transformative use test, as the legal license to transformatively appropriate an original work in the
service of creativity); see Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003) (discussing the
predominant use test, that requires the work in question to be primarily expressive, rather than
primarily commercial); Hoffman v. Cap. Cities/ABC Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding
only "reckless disregard" or a “high degree of awareness of probable falsity" as sufficient to relinquish
the transformative use protection.); see Savare & Wintermute, supra note 229, at 2-3; see Restatement
(Third) of Unfair Competition § 47 cmt. c (Am. L. Inst. 1995). The relatedness/restatement test
stresses the use of the other's identity solely to attract attention to the defendant's work, with no
justified nexus to it. See also ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 937 (6th Cir. 2003); see
Kwall supra note 13, at 136-62 (for the ad-hoc test problematic classification as actually containing
every possible test that was not previously in use, demonstrating how in ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g,
Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003), three tests were in use: the transformative test, the
relatedness/restatement approach and the actual malice test); Savare & Wintermute, supra note 229,
at 2 (offering additional ad-hoc tests); Kwall, supra note 13, at 1357-58. What Kwall regards as the ad
hoc balancing approach, is not existent in Savare & Wintermute's, who refer to the Rogers test, from
Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989), which, in turn, is not considered to be an independent
test in its own merit, in Kwall's classification. The Rogers test, which evolved to an enormously
influential doctrine in Trademark Law, was initiated by Ginger Rogers' lawsuit, who attempted to
enjoin the distribution of the 1986 Federico Fellini film Ginger and Fred. The film is about two Italian
cabaret dancers who build their career on personification of Astaire and Rogers and reunite after
thirty years of retirement for a vulgar television show. Rogers claimed that the film violated her
Lanham Act trademark rights, right of publicity, and was a "false light" defamation. The court held
that "suppressing an artistically relevant though ambiguous[ly] title[d] film" on trademark grounds
would "unduly restrict expression." Id. at 1001. And "that section 43(a) of the Lanham Act does not
bar a minimally relevant use of a celebrity's name in the title of an artistic work where the title does
not explicitly denote authorship, sponsorship, or endorsement by the celebrity or explicitly mislead as
to content." Id. at 1005.
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as a vehicle to circumvent the barrier of the commercial element in fair use.231 This
differentiates between the derivative work, exaggeratedly protected even by a fraction
of a commercial suspicion, and the transformative work, which survives this fate.232
Originality, if proven, may take the upper hand over the commercial component in fair
use through the transformative use criterion. However, originality cannot do without
its doctrinal twin: the aesthetic discrimination. 233 Straight from its inception,
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,,234 originated the transformative fair use doctrine as
a dominant criterion of whether a use is fair.235 Campbell created an unprecedented
distinction between the parody, as a protected transformative use and the satire, which
is not a protected transformative use. 236 As Keller and Tushnet demonstrate, "a
parody, which makes the original work its target, is particularly favored, while a
satire, which uses the same work to criticize something else, is not,” and “[a]ccording
to the Court, this is out of a concern that the satire may be using a preexisting work
simply to "avoid the drudgery in working up something fresh." 237 However, this
distinction requires aesthetic discrimination.238 Not only is there room for doubt that
judges are trained to fulfill this task, but as ample adjudication also proves, the
distinction depends on the current beholder in office. 239 SunTrust Bank v. Houghton
Mifflin Co. was recognized as a parody in the appellate court, thus, implying the
transformative use defense, whereas the very cause of the appeal was the lower court's
artistic perception of Alice Randall’s "The Wind Done Gone"' reflection on Gone with
the Wind as a satire, hence, infringing in copyright's eyes.240 In addition, as Tehranian
proves, the appellate court in this case, while granting Randall’s work fair use defense,
ignored commercial implications that should have annulled it. 241 However, an opposite
approach was used regarding "The Catcher in the Rye" due its canonic status, and
notwithstanding the lack of commercial implications to the author. 242 Without the
courts directly admitting it, aesthetic considerations were the very gist of those rulings.
No wonder Tushnet regards judges as bad reviewers, thus "[w]ithout recognizing that
works mean different things to different people, transformativeness as a concept is at
war with itself."243
Ironically, the aforementioned perils of judicial artistic bias are supposed to be the
optimistic side of the coin, as they reflect the adjudicational shift from property- right
Moldawer, supra note 23, at 174.
Id. at 174-76.
233 Tushnet, supra note 18, at 20.
234 Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. at 8-12, 17-20.
235 Leval, supra note 218, at 1124.
236 Keller & Tushnet, supra note 20, at 983 (proving pre-Campbell ruling, the courts treated
parody and satire alike).
237 Id. at 981; Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. at 580.
238 Keller and Tushnet, supra note 20, at 985-92.
239 Id.
240 Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1268-9 (11th Cir. 2001). Compare with
SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1385- 6 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (holding that
the "The Wind Done Gone" use of "Gone with The Wind" was well beyond what was necessary to create
a parody).
241 Tehranian, supra note 221, at 127-85.
242 Id. at 1281-85; see also Salinger v. Colting (Salinger I), 641 F. Supp. 2d 250, 253 (S.D.N.Y.
2009); Salinger v. Colting (Salinger II), 607 F.3d 68, 75-6 (2d. Cir. 2010).
243 Tushnet, supra note 18, at 27.
231
232
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focus, which recognized only market failure as a narrow outlet for fair use, into
expression, alterity focus, which enlarged fair use scope beyond the economic
approach. 244 However, Lipton and Tehranian demonstrate how tricky the fair use
defense is regarding the most important component that might annul it—the potential
commercial use or market harm under the first or fourth factors of 17 U.S. Code §
107245 . Almost every creative crowdsourcing can be construed as infringing because it
may attract advertising revenues or a consumer following.246 Hence, the monolithic
perception of romantic originality that can be attributed only to one unprecedented
author, morphs inspiration into plagiarism through the lenses of copyright law that
retain this anachronistic approach. Combined with artistic discrimination, freedom of
speech and creativity are both under assault.247 Even if the current adjudication tries
to reconcile copyright law with freedom of speech, not only from within, but,
extrinsically, vis-à-vis the First Amendment, Tushnet concludes that
the logical chain linking criticism, the First Amendment, and transformative
fair use can make those concepts seem coterminous with one another as far
as copyright defendants are concerned. The values of public access and
dissemination that were also traditionally part of fair use, and part of many
theories of free speech, get left behind. 248
The monolithic axis of copyright law keeps in line with Western thinking, which
holds the unity of absolute truth and proceeds in a straight line from the Socratic
dialogues to the categorical imperatives. 249 Followed by the perception of exclusive
originality and sole authorship, a parallel trademark law axis offers contradictory
solutions, that, although a far cry from its original legal infrastructure, can better solve
the celebrity/persona phenomenon as obstructing our culture.

244 See generally Netanel, supra note 129, at 398-9; see generally Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as
Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82
COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982) (focusing on the economic, property-right focus).
245 Lipton & Tehranian, supra note 227, at 415-16. Section 107 provides that, in determining
whether the use was fair, the factors to be considered shall include: (1) the purpose and character of
the use; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the substantiality of the portion used in relation to
the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect on the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work. Id.
246 See Savare & Wintermute, supra note 229, at 4 (demonstrating how the commercial/noncommercial distinction fails to achieve a coherent criterion).
247 See Moldawer, supra note 23, at 176-77 (describing an ample variety of artistic genres, that
would have never flourished under the current law such as Dadaism, Futurism, Fauvism, Surrealism
or Jazz); Lipton & Tehranian, supra note 227, at 428-9 (explaining the great damage to remixing,
especially in crowdsourced projects, sampling and hip-hop); Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros.
Rec., Inc., 780 F. Supp. 182, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (declaring sampling and hip-hop as sheer theft,
combining a monolithic Originality perception and musical ignorance as regards how those genres are
created); see also Arewa, supra note 107, at 483, 531-36 (discussing the courts' musical ignorance,
culminating in ruling improvisation as Copyright infringement).
248 Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How
Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 552 (2004).
249 See PLATO, SOPHIST (2008).
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C. THE AXIS OF TRADEMARK LAW: PERSONA AUTHORSHIP REVISED
The common law's duality, which unifies tort and property law, was embedded in
American trademark law to protect trademark owners when commerce was at its
inception. 250 Yet, trademark law prevailed under a different market, under
circumstances of competition that grew out of the initial local market.251 This duality
was meant to protect both trademark owners and consumers, as arbitrary or
meaningless trademarks were considered property protected by the tort of trademark
infringement.252 However, descriptive trademarks were not considered property, and
therefore, plaintiffs had to seek relief under the tort of passing off, which, even today,
is the proper cause of action in Great Britain for an unauthorized misappropriation of
celebrity personae.253 However, the “propertization” of trademarks devoured them all,
as the focus shifted towards protection of goodwill,254 culminating in the enactment of
Federal Trademark Dilution Act (“FTDA”). 255 In parallel, applying Postmodernist
vocabulary, trademark law today is a far cry from its premise. As summed up by Beebe,
[t]raditionally, trademark commentators have conceived of the trademark as
a three-legged stool, a relational system Consisting of a "signifier" (the
tangible form of the mark), a "signified" (the semantic content of the mark,
its meaning), and a "referent" (the product to which the mark is affixed).256
As Dreyfuss observed, this triad is practically obsolete.257 Trademarks morphed
to be commodities in their own right, working their way into our meta-langue and
evolving into “expressive genericity,” distinctive from their competitive and
commercial aims, such as identifying goods' source and distinguishing them from
others.258 As Justice Kozinski concluded, trademarks have "begun to leap out of their
role as source-identifiers and, in certain instances have effectively become goods in
their own right."259 Hence, trademark law's main issue is now goodwill in both arenas:
the "lost" triadic model of trademark law and the dilution doctrine.260 Thus, as detailed
in this chapter, trespassing copyright law, and, paradoxically, offering better solutions
for celebrity/persona authorship is critical.

Bracha, supra note 80, at 257.
Id. at 258.
252 Id. at 259
253 Id.
254 Id. at 262.
255 Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.)
256 Beebe, supra note 24, at 625.
257 Dreyfuss, supra note 5, at 397-98.
258 Id.
259 Plasticolor Molded Prods., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 713 F. Supp. 1329, 1332 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
Judge Alex Kozinski was influenced by Dreyfuss "expressive genericity" perception of some
trademarks and proposed to acknowledge them as Saussure's Langue; see Alex Kozinski, Trademarks
Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 974 (1993).
260 See generally Zachary Shufro, Based on a True Story: The Ever-Expanding Progeny of Rogers
v. Grimaldi, 32 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 391, 423-4 (2022).
250
251
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1. The Evolvement of Trademark Law: From a Triadic Model into a Hypermark
Defense
As Beebe argues, Schechter ironically meant to defend the goods’ distinction, due
to his understanding that avoiding consumers’ confusion, while the base of trademarks’
incentive infrastructure, is not sufficient. 261 Schechter noted that dilution will harm
the protected goods much more. 262 The doctrinal bases transformed to resemble
copyright law.263 Namely, the core of the matter is to avoid unauthorized copies of the
distinguished brand, but not to differentiate its source, or to segregate it horizontally
in comparison with other brands. 264 Historically, the original dilution definition as
offered by in 15 U.S.C. § 1125I, was omitted by the TDRA.265 This change amended 15
U.S.C.A. § 1125(c), leaving this concept to be defined at the courts discretion "according
to notions of equity and reasonableness whether dilution has occurred."266 Dilution can
be caused either by blurring, where plaintiffs "need to show actual blurring of an
inherently distinctive mark," thus challenging a prima facie strong safeguard for free
speech, which does not exist for defendants in publicity right infringement or
tarnishment cases.267 In regard to Dreyfuss' category of Statute-based factual solutions
(in contrast to Constitution-based solutions), tarnishment cases, accordingly, "reflects
the concern that a mark will be harmed by unsavory associations, and is arguably a
problem of the know-it-when-I-see it variety, making it relatively easy to establish."268
Hence, the doctrinal dichotomy between commerce and expression was rendered
obsolete.269
As far as the other area of trademark law is concerned, namely, the collapse of its
traditional triadic model and the metamorphosis of trademarks into our langue,
nothing fits the celebrity “expressive genericity” more.270 Coombe went even further
than Dreyfuss, as the latter was willing to acknowledge the idea of the public sharing
persona authorship as far as “expressive genericity" was concerned, because it “was in
a large part generated by its audience, through the way in which it was recoded and
recontextualized"271. However, the former claims that there is no halfway in celebrity
authorship, as it was wholly created by her public. Thus,

261 Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV . 813, 82124 (1927); see also Beebe, supra note 26, at 846-48 (2010).
262 Id.
263 Beebe, supra note 26, at 848.
264 Id.
265 Tan, supra note 15, at 985, n. 306; Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 (TDRA), Pub. L.
No. 109-312, § 2, 120 Stat. 1730 (2006) (codified at Lanham Act 43 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006)).
266 Tan, supra note 15, at 984.
267 Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Reconciling Trademark Rights and Expressive Values: How to Stop
Worrying and Learn to Love Ambiguity, in TRADEMARK AND LAW THEORY, A HANDBOOK OF
CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 261 (Graeme Dinwoodie & Mark Janis ed., 2007).
268 Id. (Dreyfuss' category of Statute-based factual solutions (in contrast to Constitution-based
solutions is the basis for this argument).
269 See generally VIP Products LLC v. Jack Daniel’s Props., Inc., 953 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2020),
cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1054 (2021).
270 Coombe, supra note 8, at 89.
271 Dreyfuss, supra note 267, at 262.
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[c]elebrity names and images, however, are not simply marks of identity or
simple commodities; they are also cultural texts – floating signifiers that are
continually unvested with libidinal energies, social longings, and, I will
argue, political aspirations.272
Our society, coined as “the society of the spectacle” 273 and enslaved to the
“simulacra” in exchange for the real, 274 found its match in trademark law
transformation into what Beebe275 concluded to be the death of its triadic inception:
"the triadic structuration is being attacked . . . by the granting of protection to
trademarks as products themselves."276 Hence, trademarks end with the merger of
signified and referent or as “hypermark.”277 Hypermarks are free-floating signifiers,
signifying nothing, but themselves, as best demonstrated by the celebrity
phenomenon. 278 The outcome of trademark law doctrinal metamorphosis in
comparison with copyright law is even more striking. Originally, trademark
infringement causes consumers confusion of one signifier with another in relation to
the same referent, thus trespassing goodwill. 279 Therefore, trademark protection
attempts to defend an exclusive idea, as embedded in the signified, whereas dilution
protects distinction, to prevent the weakening of the signifier, thus protecting an
expression, which was under copyright law. Although Lemley titles this
transformation as a "doctrinal creep," this "doctrinal creep" can cure a lot of publicity
right maladies, as I argue in the next chapter.280
2. The Benefits of “he "Doctrinal Creep"
The blurry doctrinal infrastructure that renders distinction between celebrity
image protection by Publicity right paradigms, or celebrity sign protection by
272 Coombe, supra note 8, at 89. Interestingly, Coombe refers to Bakhtin's approach while
discoursing Trademark Law and not Copyright Law. Id. at 82.
273 Debord, supra note 6, at Ch. I.
274 Baudrillard, supra note 52, at Ch. I.
275 Beebe, supra note 24, at 625.
276 Id. at 656-57.
277 Mira Moldawer, Cassandra's Curse or Cassandra's Triumph: Three Tales of Intellectual
Property Revised, 43 LOYOLA L.A. ENTM’T L. REV. (forthcoming 2022). "[A]n integral part of
Postmodernist resistance to one universal and absolute truth was its "rejection of the strict anchoring
of particular signifiers to particular signifieds,” which evolved into the concept of the "floating
signifier", originated by Claude Lévi-Strauss, although heavily influenced by Derrida." See also
Jeffrey Mehlman, The "Floating Signifier": From Lévi-Strauss to Lacan, 48 YALE FRENCH STUD.,
FRENCH FREUD: STRUCTURAL STUD. IN PSYCHOANALYSIS 10, 23-4, 36-7 (1972); Jeanne S. M. Willette,
Postmodernism and The Trail of the Floating Signifier, PHILOSOPHY ART HIST. UNSTUFFED (Feb. 21,
2014), https://arthistoryunstuffed.com/postmodernism-floating-signifier/21/2/14.
278 Moldawer, supra note 277. "The David Beckham phenomenon illustrates how a talented soccer
player became a floating signifier, and part of our metalanguage. He is no more considered as a mere
athlete, but as the quintessence of success, sex appeal and a vessel for anyone dreams (females and
males, alike)." Id.; Peter Conrad, Blend It Like Beckham, THE GUARDIAN: THE OBSERVER (May 25,
2003), http://observer.guardian.co.uk/review/story/0,6903,962904,00.html.
279 Beebe, supra note 24, at 675-76.
280 See generally Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108
YALE L.J. 1687, 1698 (1999).
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trademark law, to be nonexistent, leads to contradictory legal results. As Keller and
Tushnet demonstrate, even before the dilution doctrine morphed trademark into
expressions contesting First Amendment Freedom of Speech, the courts applied "the
concept of nominative fair use, which either supplements or supplants the traditional
multifactor confusion analysis."281 In order to deal with trademark parody,
[f]irst, the plaintiffs product or service in question must be one not
readily identifiable without use of the trademark; second, only so much
of the mark or marks may be used as is reasonably necessary to
identify the plaintiffs product or service; and third, the user must do
nothing that would, in conjunction with the mark, suggest sponsorship
or endorsement by the trademark holder.282
However, even these tests proved to be astonishingly flexible, as at times courts
were willing to skip "necessity" component, or, to almost let go "the minimal use"
request.283
Publicity right requires unauthorized endorsements, not consumer confusion. 284
Hence, the next stage is to analyze the courts adjudication once the plaintiff sues for
both trademark and publicity right infringement. Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League
Baseball Players Ass’n proved the benevolent approach to Freedom of Speech in
trademark law in regard to celebrities’ parodies vis-à-vis their symbolic social
function. 285 The benevolent approach prevailed over the narrower interpretation of
publicity right, despite commercial use being involved, which would amount to a
contradictory result in regard to copyright law fair use. 286 Likewise, the deadly
parody/satire dichotomy, that narrowed copyright fair use to the former, but refused
to grant it to the latter, was replaced with transformative use in trademark
infringement, thus, massively improving free speech defense in trademark law.287
Recently, in Matal v. Tam, the Supreme Court acknowledged purely commercial
speech as private speech under the First Amendment, thus, proving Cardtoons, L.C.
v. Major League Baseball Players’Ass'n to be even more of settled law. 288 The Supreme
Court reflected Postmodernist thinking, perceiving the realm of trademarks as the
metaphorical marketplace of ideas and transforming them into a tangible powerful
See generally Keller & Tushnet, supra note 20, at 1005.
Id. at n. 123. From the impressive list of cases detailed by the authors in this footnote, most
illuminating is New Kids on the Block v. News America Publ'g, 971 F.2d 302, 307 (9th Cir. 1992).
"[H]olding that nominative fair uses are uses "to which the infringement laws simply do not apply."
283 Id. at 1006-07.
284 Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Attribution Right in the United States: Caught in the Crossfire
between Copyright and Section 43(A), 77 WASH. L. REV. 985, 996 (2002). "The crux of a copyright
violation is unlawful copying, not false representations concerning the work's authorship." As argued
in this article, the legal justifications of publicity right authorship are based on Copyright Law
theoretical infrastructure.
285 Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 967 (10th Cir. 1996).
286 Lemley, supra note 15, at 1175-6.
287 Keller & Tushnet, supra note 20, at 1013; see, for example, Mattel Inc. v. MCA Rec. Inc., 296
F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002); Louis Vuitton Malletier SA v Haute Diggity Dog LLC, 507 F.3d 252 (4th Cir.
2007); Louis Vuitton Malletier SA v My Other Bag Inc., 674 Fed. Appx. 16, No. 16-241-cv (22 Dec
2016).
288 Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1760 (2017).
281
282
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reality.289 In Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, Justice Thomas, could see no difference,
historically or philosophically, for discriminating commercial speech. 290 In Matal,
Justice Bryer concurred: "[w]hen the government seeks to restrict truthful speech in
order to suppress the ideas it conveys, strict scrutiny is appropriate, whether or not
the speech in question may be characterized as commercial."291 This approach was
followed in Iancu v. Brunetti, holding 15 U.S.C. § 1052 unconstitutional for violating
the First Amendment by denying trademark registration under the Lanham Act for a
mark described as the equivalent of a profane word.292 The statute not only left room
for bias that resulted in viewpoint-discriminatory application, but attempted to cover
the universe of immoral or scandalous material.293 This is a far cry from the hybrid
expression that makes Publicity Right so powerful, as the commercial expression is
almost banned from copyright fair use.
Another successful way for understanding Freedom of Speech as being deeply
embedded in trademark law is to interpret “the second arena", namely, the dilution
doctrine, as demonstrated in Mattel Inc. v. MCA Records Inc.294 The Ninth Circuit refused
trademarks holders to translate their goodwill into a vehicle of censorship, unlike
parallel lawsuits for publicity right infringement.295 As best explained by Justice Alex
Kozinski in Mattel Inc.:296
trademarks often fill in gaps in our vocabulary and add a contemporary flavor
to our expressions. Once imbued with such expressive value, the trademark
becomes a word in our language and assumes a role outside the bounds of
trademark law . . . . Were we to ignore the expressive value that some marks
assume, trademark rights would grow to encroach upon the zone protected
by the First Amendment.297 Simply put, the trademark owner does not have
the right to control public discourse whenever the public imbues his mark
with a meaning beyond its source-identifying function.298

Id. at 1765.
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 575 (2001).
291 Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1769 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
292 See generally Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294 (2019).
293 Id.
294 MCA Rec. Inc., 296 F.3d at 900 (9th Cir. 2002). This case was a series of lawsuits between
Mattel, and MCA Records that resulted from the 1997 hit single "Barbie Girl" by Danish group Aqua,
which referred to Barbie as a "Blonde Bimbo." Over the years, Mattel manufactured their famous
Barbie into a glamorous, long-legged blonde, as a symbol of American girlhood. "With Barbie, Mattel
created not just a toy but a cultural icon." Id. at 898. Regarding the "second arena" in this article, i.e.,
the dilution doctrine, Mattel claimed the song violated the Barbie trademark by turning Barbie into
a sex object, and that its lyrics had tarnished the reputation of their trademark. On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit ruled the song was protected as a parody under the trademark doctrine of nominative use and
the First Amendment.
295 Lumley, supra note 15, at 1176, n. 107 (demonstrating how "on the same day by the same
judges, the Ninth Circuit came to radically different results in the NFL and NCAA cases").
296 MCA Records Inc., 296 F.3d at 900.
297 Id.; see also Yankee Publ'g, Inc. v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 267, 276 (S.D.N.Y.
1992).
298 Id. at 901; see Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Group, 611 F.2d 296, 301 (9th Cir. 1979).
"It is the source-denoting function which trademark laws protect, and nothing more."
289
290
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Trademark law as absorbing Postmodernist vocabulary into personae authorship
allowed her audience to encode it either through parodies, satires, or criticism.299 As
the celebrity/brand is part of Saussure's la langue, it can be easily translated into
trademark law toolkit as a generic sign.300 In light of this, the Rogers test can be easily
viewed as part of Saussure's la langue; namely "Ginger and Fred" transformed into
generic signs, thus, losing trademark protection.301 As Tang argues, genericide can
cure copyright's maladies, because
[g]enericide does everything fair use does not do. It recognizes antiuniqueness in an age rife with appropriation art (in which images and objects
are taken straight—and often wholesale—from our collective pop culture)
and satire (in which the copyrighted work is used as a vehicle for general
commentary on the state of society, a genre of work, and so on, rather than
targeting the work itself) and the eradication of the author. It accommodates
the use of marks not for purposes of commenting upon but for purposes of
signification; it recognizes the right of the public, not the trademark owner,
to decide a mark’s fate. It is audience-friendly and First Amendmentapproved.302
The Rogers test contributed enormously to retrieving the public domain, as proved
recently in Jack Daniel’s Props. Inc. v. VIP Prods LLC.303 A dog toy that parodied
plaintiff's trademark and trade dress was held by the Ninth Circuit to be an
“expressive work,” although sold as a commercial product. 304 Once an allegedly
infringing work is classified as an “expressive work,” the appellate court can
implement the Rogers test: (1) is the use of the trademark in question is inherently
related to the work, and (2) is the defendant's work explicitly misleading as to its
endorsement by the plaintiff?305 As noted by Cumbow, "[t]he “explicitly misleading”
factor is hard to overcome, so most applications of the Rogers test end in a victory for

299 See Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., 73 F.3d 497, 503, 506-7 (2nd Cir. 1996); LL
Bean Inc., v. Drake Publrs. Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 29, 32-34 (1st Cir. 1987); see Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records,
Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002), at 900, 907; Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v Haute Diggity Dog LLC,
507 F.3d 252, at 257, 260-3, 266-8 (2007); Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. My Other Bag, Inc., 156 F.
Supp. 3d 425, 435–38 (S.D.N.Y. 2016); see Lucasfilm Ltd. v. High Frontier, 622 F. Supp. 931, 933,935
(D.D.C. 1985); Radiance Found., Inc. v. Nat'l Ass'n for Advancement of Colored People, 786 F.3d 316,
319, 321-2, 325, 327, 332 (4th Cir. 2015).
300 See Dreyfuss, supra note 5, at 397-98; Beebe & Fromer, supra note 5, at 982.
301 Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999.
302 Xiyin Tang, Against Fair Use: The Case for a Genericness Defense in Expressive Trademark
Uses, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1949, 2024 (2016).
303 VIP Prods. LLC, 953 F.3d at 1172, 1176.
304 See Shufro, supra note 260, at 410-5 for the detailed analysis of Jack Daniel’s Props. Inc. v.
VIP Prods LLC, 953 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2020).
305 Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999. The Court held:

In the context of allegedly misleading titles using a celebrity’s name, [the] balance
will normally not support application of the Act unless the title has no artistic
relevance to the underlying work whatsoever, or, if it has some artistic relevance,
unless the title explicitly misleads as to the source or the content of the work.
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the First Amendment.306 In the absence of anything explicitly misleading, the Ninth
Circuit concluded that VIP’s use of Jack Daniel’s trademarks is protected by the First
Amendment.307 The mens rea required in the Rogers test is absent in copyright law
infringement, thus, leading to the opposite outcome.308 Although both the appellate
court's ruling and the Supreme Court certiorari's denial are grounded in Louis Vuitton
v. Haute Diggity Dog, as, prima facie, a similar case, in which a chew-toy for dogs
marketed as “Chewy Vuitton”, used the plaintiff's famous LV logo pattern as a
mockery, numerous brand owners and trademark authorities thought otherwise.
Accordingly, "if virtually anything, even a commercial product, can be regarded as an
'expressive work', the protections and purposes of trademark law will be
eviscerated."309 No wonder Shufro chose to title his critical article of Jack Daniel’s
Properties Inc. v. VIP Products LLC as; "the ever-expanding progeny of Rogers". 310
Doctrinally, the gist of Shufro's criticism is that courts no longer distinguish between
the two areas as previously mentioned.311 In short, both areas now defend goodwill:
the expression, not the idea. Although a far cry from trademark law premise, its
current interpretation is better suited to mend copyright law’s poor treatment of
persona/celebrity Authorship. The cure for the poor balanced perception between
authorship and the public domain in copyright law can be done through trademark
law's toolkit.
D. PERSONA GENERIC USE AS A PROPOSED SOLUTION
To enhance the original targets of the intellectual property paradigm, the law,
which instilled the persona with her exaggerated cultural power, should balance
between authorship and the public domain. Scholars attempt to settle authorship's
perils within copyright law doctrinal basis, and it is alluring to comply with this
premise, as these perils are intrinsic to copyright law infrastructure.312 However, the
306 Robert C. Cumbow, Supreme Court Denies Cert in Jack Daniel’s Dog Toy Case, MILLER NASH
(Jan 19, 2021), https://www.millernash.com/industry-news/supreme-court-denies-cert-in-jackdaniels-dog-toy-case.
307 VIP Prods. LLC, 953 F.3d at 1175-76.
308 See Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177, 180-81 (S.D.N.Y.
1976) (for the concept of unconscious infringement); Arewa, supra note 107, at 533 (for the implications
of Copyright Law lack of Mens Rea on the defendant's onus of proof).
309 See generally VIP Products LLC, cert. denied, 592 U.S. 208 (2021). Both the appellate court's
ruling and the Supreme Court certiorari's denial are grounded in Louis Vuitton v. Haute Diggity Dog
(507 F.3d 252, 4th Cir. 2007); see Cumbow, supra note 306 (providing a general reaction of brand
owners and trademark authorities).
310 Shufro, supra note 260, at 391.
311 Id.

In its opinion, the Ninth Circuit not only stretched the purpose of the Rogers test
to a breaking point, but also improperly relied upon the test’s basic premise as
grounds to incorrectly dispose of a claim for trademark dilution, despite the
different standards, purposes, and policy goals of trademark infringement and
trademark dilution statutes.
312 See Netanel, supra note 217, at 191-92; Reid Kress Weisbord, A Copyright Right of Publicity,
84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2803, 2831-2 (2016).
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interpretation that was supposed to mend it, is leaning on external values such as free
speech and information or free competition. Hence, although in practice the division
between the “inner circle” of Copyright Law and “outer circle” of the constitutional
rights is somewhat artificial, as they are blended, methodically, it would be easier to
cure the handicaps of the inner “circle” of Copyright Law toolkit by absorbing into it
the outer "circle" values, to create a better holistic infrastructure in the former.313
1. Is Fair Use Enough?
Both Blanch v. Koons and Cariou v. Prince led some scholars to believe that
Postmodernist approaches were trickling into copyright law infrastructure, and thus
changing authorship balance for the benefit of the latter.314 Blanch represented for
Jaszi the "rejection of the grand narrative of authorship and “authority,” that creates
a better balance between "participants in the processes of cultural production and
consumption." 315 Kausnic dwelled on the audience as the necessary component of
creation, as "Koons carefully refused to infuse particular meaning to the work, but
rather empowered the viewer with establishing his or her own relative meaning." 316
Cariou went even further, seeming to do the impossible by crossing the border of fair
use altogether. 317 The question posed in Cariou, was "whether the artist Richard
Prince, in taking plaintiff Cariou’s photographs and altering them, had any intention
to comment on Cariou’s original works." 318 The question bears resemblance to most
transformative use defenses. The novelty is the very death of fair use defense once
Prince answered the question in the negative. However, the court held that to qualify
for a fair use defense the artist's work need not comment on the original. It is legally
satisfactory if the alleged infringing work presents a new expression, meaning, or
message in comparison with the original, without relating to it at all. Another
innovative point was the perception of different audiences for the plaintiff and
defendant, as courts tend to regard the public as homogenous, a far cry from Fiske's
313 See Orit Fischman-Afori, Cultural Rights and Human Rights: A Proposal for A Balanced Way
to Develop Israeli Copyright Law, 37 HEBREW UNIV. L. REV. 499, 571, 573 (2007) [Hebrew] (for the
insertion of external constitutional rights, while attempting to interpret copyright law internally on
its own ground).
314 Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 250-9 (2nd Cir. 2006); see also Peter Jaszi, supra note 108, at
116, 118, 120 (2009); Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 698, 706 (2d Cir. 2013).
315 Jaszi, supra note 108, at 116.
316 Robert Kausnic, The Problem of Meaning in Non-Discursive Expression, 57 J. OF COPYRIGHT
SOC’Y OF USA 399, 421 (2010).
317 Cariou, 714 F.3d at 694. The court held that the district court imposed an incorrect legal
standard when it concluded that, in order to qualify for a fair use defense, the artist's work had to
comment on the photographer, the photographs, or on aspects of popular culture closely associated
with the photographer or the photographs. The court ruled that 25 of the artworks made fair use of
the copyrighted photographs because the artworks presented a new expression, meaning, or
message. The artworks were transformative because they manifested an entirely different aesthetic
from the photographs since the artist's composition, presentation, scale, color palette, and media
were fundamentally different and new compared to the photographs, as was the expressive nature of
the artist's work. The artist's audience was very different from the photographer's audience, and
there was no evidence that the artist's work ever touched, much less usurped, either the primary or
derivative market for the photographer's work.
318 Tang, supra note 302, at 2043.
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Semiotic democracy. 319 If the plaintiff's potential consumers are different from the
defendant's, no harm would follow for the plaintiff’s market, neither to its primary
market, nor to the original work’s derivative market.320
The same artistic practice earned Koons a humiliating legal defeat in Rogers v.
Koons.321 However, the legal enthusiasm of Koons was wishful thinking. The Andy
Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts, Inc. v. Lynn Goldsmith held that retrieving fair
use begs consideration of its evasiveness and unpredictability.322 Unfortunately, the
copyright misuse doctrine, that could have solved the chameleon phenomenon of fair
use, was not applied in copyright law and is usually connected with antitrust law or
free competition. 323 Carol Loeb Schloss v. Sea'n Sweeney and the Estate of James Joyce, a
lawsuit for copyright misuse against the James Joyce estate, which allegedly disguised
censorship attempts, while enjoining the plaintiff access to information concerning
Joyce’s mentally-ill daughter, was settled out of court.324 With the fair use doctrine not
being enough, we need to dig further in order to import trademark law legal
evolvement into copyright law’s current unpredictability.
2. Persona Generic Use
The most important doctrinal kit in copyright law that could solve fair use
ambiguity is intrinsic: the idea/expression dichotomy. The question posed is: can we
transform trademark law’s generic sign paradigm, that unarms the previously
protected sign, into the category of an uncopyrightable idea, thus, unarming persona
publicity right from its overpowering doctrinal armor?
The expression is the Blackstonian premise that morphed into the romantic
perception that authorship is the vehicle through which the agonizing genius turns
"pure" ideas into unprecedented expressions.325 If the "clothed" ideas reflect the artist's
feeling, they gain value, and this value is translated into property right, as seen by the
seminal precedent Pope v. Curl.326 Pope that evolved into an attempt to form an eternal
property right in Millar v. Taylor and was finally crystallized in Donaldson v. Becket
as a time limited property right.327 Yet, Pope is a far cry from Sir John Dalrymple's
See, Cario, 714 F.3d at 709.
Id.; see also Barry Werbin, Art & Advocacy – The ‘Transformation’ of Fair Use After Prince v.
Cariou, HERRICK (Feb. 2014), https://www.herrick.com/publications/the-transformation-of-fair-useafter-prince-v-cariou/.
321 Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 303-4 (2d Cir. 1992).
322 Andy Warhol Found. for the Visual Arts, Inc. v. Lynn Goldsmith, et al., 11 F.4th 26 (2d Cir.
2021).
323 Shur-Ofry, supra note 84, at 57.
324 Carol Loeb Schloss v. Sea'n Sweeney & the Estate of James Joyce, 515 F. Supp.2d 1083, 1086
(N.D. Cal. 2007); see also Carol Loeb Schloss, Privacy and the Misuse of Copyright: The Case of Schloss
v. the Estate of James Joyce, in MODERNISM & COPYRIGHT 243 (Paul K. Saint-Amour ed., 2011)
(providing Plaintiff’s commentary on the case).
325 1 Black. W. 301, 322-23, 96 Eng. Rep. 169, 172-3 (K.B. 1760), reargued and dismissed, 1 Black.
W. 322, 96 Eng. Rep. 180, 180-1, 184 (K.B. 1761); Coombe, supra note 8, at 211.
326 Pope v. Curll (1741) 2 Atk. 342, 26 Eng. Rep. 608 (Ch.); see also MARK ROSE, THE AUTHOR IN
COURT: POPE V. CURLL (1741) 197 (2017); Woodmansee & Jaszi, supra note 16, at 211, 227.
327 Millar v. Taylor (1769), 98 Eng. Rep. 201 at 252-53; Donaldson v. Becket (1774) Hansard, 1st
ser., 17 (1774), 999-1001. See also Ronan Deazley, Commentary on Donaldson v. Becket (1774), in
319
320
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false prediction, namely, the “term Literary Property, he in a manner laughed at." 328
However, what is considered to be an idea, free for public use, as distinguished from a
protected expression, was never easy to define.329 Therefore, as Jaszi notes, following
Fish and Ginsburg, the idea/expression dichotomy is a fictional narrative. 330
Moreover, the premise clashes with another basic concept of copyright law: the
conception of fixation. From that aspect, ideas cannot be fixed, hence, out of copyright
law scope. As Coombe argues, persona attributes resemble ideas in their essence as
"unfixable."331 Therefore, an idea as a social construed product is best demonstrated
by the persona conceptual evolvement.
Can we treat the persona as our social code, either under the scène à faire
doctrine or the merger doctrine? As Shur-Ofry argues, popularity matters. 332 Her
advocacy for lessening copyright law protection until total annulment over popular
works lies in their perception as part of our Saussure's Langue, thus, equivalent to
uncopyrightable ideas. 333 From authorship’s perspective, the same public that
transformed a protected trademark sign into a generic sign, rendering it unentitled for
its protection, is the same public that encoded the persona into his language and subculture.334 As Dreyfuss argues,
particular usages [of a word] can require listeners to consider several
denotations, their respective connotations, and the connections between
them. This effort can lead to a new level of understanding, which might not
have been achieved by words lacking the same associational set.335
Argento offers a test for applying Genericide to the Right of Publicity.336 While
embedded in trademark's lenses, it can be applied in determining whether the persona
evolved into an idea: " whether the aspect of the celebrity's persona at issue has been
used in the public dialogue with a clearly separate meaning over a long period of
time."337 She offers ten years, twice as much as requested in the Lanham Act in order
PRIMARY SOURCES ON COPYRIGHT (1450-1900) (L. Bently & M. Kretschmer, eds., 2008) for the six
sources in regard to Donaldson v. Becket (1774).
328 JOSEPH LOEWENSTEIN, THE AUTHOR’S DUE 3 (2002) (writing on the appellant's counselor in
Donaldson v. Becket).
329 See Boyle, supra note 89, at 55-57.
330 Stanley Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory,
LITERARY AND LEGAL STUD. 61 (1989); Jane C. Ginsburg, Sabotaging and Reconstructing History: A
Comment on the Scope of Copyright Protection in Works of History After Hoeling v. Universal City
Studios, 29 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y OF THE U.S.A 647, 658 (1982); Woodmansee & Jaszi, supra note
16, at 29.
331 Coombe, supra note 8, at 99.
332 See generally Shur-Ofry, supra note 84.
333 Id. at 81-82, 155, 237, 316. .
334 Id. at 167-86, 172, 182, 230.
335 Dreyfuss, supra note 5, at 414.
336 Zoe Argento, Applying Genericide to the Right of Publicity, 10 VAND. J. OF ENTM’T & TECH.
LAW 321, 348 (2008).
337 Id.
The intent of this test is to show that the primary significance to the public of a
celebrity's persona has an autonomous meaning, separate from its function of
identifying the individual. The test does so by requiring that the public has not only
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to prove that a trademark in commercial use has acquired a secondary meaning. 338 As
Argento notes, "[m]ost importantly, genericide would protect a considerable amount of
free speech. Ideas that have become inexpressible without a celebrity's name or image
would return to the public domain".339
One of the most important and difficult cultural dilemmas is what transforms
myth into a cliché. Also important is the pro and contra arguments for the clichés'
existence and whether a language can survive without them. 340 Although those
matters are out of this article's scope, I argue that even if Helene of Troy was
nicknamed the "dumb blonde," thus, transforming a myth into a cliché, both myth and
cliché are part of our language and identity. Because of this, they legally need to be
treated accordingly, not only under trademark law, but under copyright law as well.
III. CONCLUSION
Humanity is made of its current myths and clichés that constitute its cultural
fabric.341 Yet, our language, identity, and dreams are governed by intellectual property
rights, especially publicity right and trademarks.342 As argued in this article, while
legally publicity right and trademarks own their foundation to the tort of
misappropriation, they evolved into two contradictory axes in their authorship
perception of the persona. Whereas the Trademark axis allowed the public to recreate
her as a "signifier" of new narratives, the Copyright Law axis retained sole authorship
to the persona in her image.343
The persona publicity right morphed to be the strongest intellectual property right
under the wrong umbrella of copyright law infrastructure. This granted the persona
much more than her fair share in authorship. This is due to copyright law’s monolithic
authorship perception as conceived in the Enlightenment era and its twin false
narratives, namely, “aesthetic nondiscrimination" and originality. Ignoring the
interaction between the persona and her ever-evolving audiences that always recreate
her, especially in the Internet era, plays a vital part in the Persona's Authorship. The
doctrinal failure of both the “aesthetic nondiscrimination" and the "originality"
narratives is demonstrated by copyright’s main tools that were meant to balance
between the author and the public domain: the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use,

appropriated and invested the celebrity's persona with independent meaning, but
that the particular use of the celebrity's persona has become embedded in the
culture.
Id. at 351, n. 170; 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (2022).
Id. at 362.
340 See Ryan Cooper, In Defense of Clichés, SLATE (Nov. 4, 2014), https://slate.com/humaninterest/2014/04/cliches-despite-what-orwell-and-the-washingtion-post-say-overused-phrases-can-beuseful.html accessed 11.4.22 (claiming that clichés which Orwell regards as "corrupt writing" is not
necessarily capable of corrupting thought). Compare with George Orwell, Politics and the English
Language, in GEORGE ORWELL, WHY I WRITE 102, 106, 112, 114 (2004).
341 See generally Geertz, supra note 29.
342 HENRI LEFEBVRE, WE ARE SURROUNDED BY EMPTINESS, BUT IT IS AN EMPTINESS FILLED WITH
SIGNS 165 (1985).
343 See generally Beebe, supra note 24; Coombe, supra note 8, at 93-99.
338
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culminating in a real threat to the Freedom of Speech. 344. Initially, not only ideas
would be "free as the air to common use," but, as they are not original, they are
constitutionally valueless and do not deserve copyright law protection.345 Hence, the
Gordian note between the idea/expression dichotomy establishes originality and
freedom of speech. However, the "plot thickens," the more an uncopyrightable idea
expands to a general "look and feel."346 Consequently, what was supposed to constitute
an uncopyrightable idea morphed into an expression, due the judge’s “aesthetic
discrimination" and instinct, rubbing the public domain's ever diminishing freedom of
speech. The transformative use, the quintessence of fair use, was meant by the courts
to establish the right balance between creativity and the First Amendment, thus,
mending the narrow economic approach to freedom of expression. However, the
outcome merely proved that the marriage of aesthetic nondiscrimination and
originality, as the false narratives of the law, begot the very phenomenon
transformative use was meant to avoid: the closure of the cultural public common,
especially regarding publicity right. This evolved through the parody/satire dichotomy
and the courts' interpretation of the commercial use component in the fair use doctrine,
which makes the distinction between news, entertainment, and commerce in the
current hybrid media, almost impossible.
Western thinking, that holds the unity of absolute truth proceeds in a straight
line from the Socratic dialogues to the Categorical Imperatives. The monolithic axis of
Copyright Law follows by its perception of exclusive Originality and sole Authorship.
In contrast, a parallel Trademark Law axis offers contradictory solutions that,
although a far cry from its original legal infrastructure, can better solve the
celebrity/persona phenomenon as obstructing our culture.
Our society, coined as "the society of the spectacle" by Debord and enslaved to the
"simulacra" in exchange for the real, found its match in trademark law.347 The latter
evolved from its competitive and commercial aims and its traditional triadic model,
that was meant to identify goods' source and distinguishing them from others, into
granting protection to trademarks as products themselves. Together with the dilution
doctrine, trademark law morphed into protecting goodwill, i.e.: the expression and not
the idea. Thus, replacing copyright law’s original aim, while forsaking its own.
Trademarks became our meta–langue by evolving into “expressive genericity” and
reflecting a similar semiotic process that embedded the persona/celebrity in the very
same meta–langue.348 Trademark law’s current interpretation is better suited to mend
copyright law’s ill treatment of celebrity authorship as it is not bound by the parody
Id. at 259-66.
Int’l News Serv. 248 U.S. at 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) “[t]he general rule of law is,
that the noblest of human productions - knowledge, truths ascertained, conceptions, and ideas—
become, after voluntary communication to others, free as the air to common use.”
346 See generally Walker, supra note 18.
347 See Beebe, supra note 24, at 624, 657-8, 683. (For the translation of the "the society of the
spectacle" into the current state of Trademark Law in which the brands are becoming the goods in
their own right); see generally Debord, supra note 6; Baudrillard, supra note 52.
348 See Dreyfuss, supra note 5, at 397-98; Barton Beebe, What Trademark Law Is Learning from
the Right of Publicity, 42 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 389, 394-5 (2019) (arguing that trademark law that has
become more like right of publicity law, although not for the better) compare with Stacey L. Dogan &
Mark A. Lemley, What the Right of Publicity Can Learn from Trademark Law, 58 STAN . L. REV. 1161,
1165-6 (2006).
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and satire dichotomy and the commercial speech discrimination. The cure for the ill
balanced perception between authorship and the public domain in copyright law can
be done by applying trademark law's genericide to the right of publicity through a
different reading of the idea and expression dichotomy. The question of persona
authorship, inevitably, leads to the real issue behind its publicity right, namely, who
is the legal author of our myths and our dreams. By recognizing the celebrity as part
of our language, we can retrieve our own lost authorship in our myths and our clichés.

